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ABSTRACT 
 
The existence of judicial review confronts scholars of political institutions, 
particularly scholars of law and judicial politics, with several important questions. Why 
do democracies like the U.S. allow courts staffed by unelected judges to have the final 
say on all constitutional questions? Why do elected political institutions—notably 
Congress and the president —refrain from using their institutions prerogatives to curb or 
constrain courts? Existing research on these questions can be categorized into two 
groups. Independence-based theories of judicial review argue that some mechanism 
constrains the other branches of government to respect judicial review. Majoritarian 
theories of judicial review argue that governments can desire courts to exercise judicial 
review in ways that advance the government’s policy goals. While previous research 
efforts have yielded much fruit, I build upon it in three important areas. First, scholars 
have yet to fully and directly consider the role of the Court’s ideological preferences 
when studying the relationship between judicial independence and judicial review, a task 
to which I devote my attention in chapter 2. In chapter 3, I argue that majoritarian 
theories need to take into account the separation of powers between branches of 
government. In chapter 4, I examine severability doctrine in order to derive and test new 
hypotheses based on both legal scholarship and positive political theory. I conclude in 
chapter 5 by summarizing the results of my research and noting future areas of inquiry.
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Origins and Inquiries of Judicial Review 
A defining characteristic of constitutional courts like the U.S. Supreme Court is 
their ability to exercise judicial review. Using this power, constitutional courts can make 
decisions that undermine the policy goals of legislative and executive officials by 
invalidating statutes and executive actions. In the U.S., such broad political powers are 
wielded by judges who are unelected and possess lifelong tenure. This arrangement, is, 
on its face, contrary to important principles of electoral democracy. But the U.S. 
Supreme Court is subject to the different methods of court curbing by Congress and the 
president. These processes go beyond simply ignoring or circumventing decisions made 
by the judiciary, a possibility since most courts rarely have power outside of 
pronouncing the legality of the cases it is hearing (Epstein and Knight 1998, Meernik 
and Ignagni 1997, Dahl 1957).   The other branches have control over the budgets of 
judiciaries, with the option of either supplying or starving courts of resources like 
support staff and salary increases (Hayo and Voight 2007; Ura and Wohlfarth 2010). 
The other branches also have the ability to change the amount of discretion 
constitutional courts have in determining their docket, allowing elected officials to limit 
the realm of cases where constitutional courts can exert their influence (Harvey 2013). 
Finally, the other branches have the ability to pursue constitutional changes that would 
damage a constitutional court or even impeach the justices (Whittington 2007). 
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Yet even with the means to punish the Supreme Court, Congress and the 
president do not interfere with the operations of the Court on a regular basis. Consider 
the case Citizens United v. FEC, in which the Supreme Court ruled that portions of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 were unconstitutional. Legal scholars have 
described the ruling in Citizens United as “the most countermajoritarian decision 
invalidating national legislation on an issue of high public salience in the last quarter 
century” (Pildes 2010). Given the other branches’ combined ability to court curb and 
even ignore this decision, it would not be surprising for the Supreme Court to see 
reprisals. But as has been noted, “there has been virtually no suggestion of any 
legislative effort to retaliate against the Court or bring it to account, nor to challenge the 
ruling directly by enacting new legislation that tests the Court’s commitment to the 
decision” (Pildes 2010). This creates a puzzle for scholars of judicial politics: why do 
democratic governments tolerate judicial review of their actions by constitutional courts? 
 A large research agenda in both the American and comparative literatures has 
developed around this central question. But while previous research efforts have yielded 
much fruit, current scholarly understanding of judicial review suffers from three 
important deficits. First, scholars have yet to fully and directly consider the role of the 
Court’s ideological preferences in its exercise of judicial review. Current theoretical 
work implicitly assumes that a constitutional court’s independence from other branches 
of government conditions the role that a court’s ideological preferences play in its 
decision to exercise judicial review. Yet this argument has yet to be explicitly made, and 
empirical tests of such theories only show that judicial independence from court-curbing 
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only allows for constitutional courts to strike more laws. Chapter 2 addresses shows that 
this inconsistently is present across a wide range of theoretical accounts of judicial 
review and seeks to test empirically the argument core at the center of these theories 
using U.S. Supreme Court data. 
Second, majoritarian theories of judicial review posit that elected officials can 
rely on a constitutional court’s power of judicial review as a tool to advance the 
government’s policy goals. Such theories largely focus on the U.S. Supreme Court and 
cite historical accounts of such activity. But these theoretical mechanisms do not take 
into account a system of government characterized by a separation of powers, largely 
treating elected officials as if they control a monolithic policymaking institution. Given 
that different branches of government can have different preferences over whether the 
Court strikes a statute, which branch of government does a court support? In chapter 3, I 
answer this question using the first quantitative test of majoritarian theories of judicial 
review.  
Third, scholars have largely limited their study of judicial review on the question 
of whether a government action is constitutional or not. Constitutional courts like the 
U.S. Supreme Court, however, must make a number of additional decisions after 
determining an action is unconstitutional. Perhaps the most prominent decision that must 
be made is the decision whether an unconstitutional statute is severable or inseverable. 
While legal scholars have long debated the Court’s approach to severability, it has yet to 
be studied from a positive standpoint. Chapter 3 fills this gap by applying both legal 
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scholarship and positive political theory to derive and then test a series of hypotheses 
about the Court’s use of severability doctrine. 
I conclude this work by discussing the major results in this paper. This discussion 
will also highlight limitations with the collective studies and potential areas for future 
research. 
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2. THE CONDITIONING ROLE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE 
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Scholars have long recognized the importance of strategic decision-making in 
explaining judicial behavior (Epstein and Knight 1997). Judges must make their 
decisions by taking into account the actions of their peers (Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 
1999, Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000, Bonneau, Hammond, Maltzman, and 
Wahlbeck 2007) and higher-ranking judges (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 
Hansford, Spriggs, and Stenger 2013) in order to achieve decisions that best advance 
their ideological preferences and legal jurisprudence. Beyond the confines of the 
judiciary, judges must also make decisions that will placate other political elites (Spiller 
and Gely 1992, Vanberg 2001, Rios-Figueroa 2007, Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 
2011) and the public (Mishler and Sheehan 1993, McGuire and Stimpson 2004, Clark 
2009, Carruba 2009) in order to ensure implementation of their decisions and to avoid 
court-curbing efforts. Cumulatively, these latter studies poignantly demonstrate that 
judicial independence is far from guaranteed for most courts. Further, the level of 
independence a court has drastically influences its behavior; this is especially true for 
decisions involving judicial review since these decisions are usually of interest to both 
the political elite and the public. 
Yet while scholars have regularly grappled with the strategic implications of 
judicial independence for judicial review, their empirical efforts do not always match 
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their theoretical work. Consider the case of Gonzales v. Carhart (2007). The U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 as constitutional. 
Whatever the legal merits of the case, the 5-4 decision clearly split the justices on 
ideological grounds. Writing for the conservative members of the Court, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion remarked that “[t]he act expresses respect for the dignity of 
human life”. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by the liberal wing of the Court, called 
the decision “alarming” and lamented that it “reflects ancient notions of women’s place 
in the family and under the Constitution — ideas that have long since been discredited.” 
Using this case as an example, one can see a distinct gulf between the theoretical 
and the empirical contributions in previous work. From a theoretical perspective, 
Gonzales is entirely consistent with the literature. The U.S. Supreme Court, a historically 
popular institution, issued the highly publicized Gonzales decision at a time when the 
U.S. government was divided between a Republican, pro-life President Bush and a 
Democratic, pro-choice Congress, both of which were controlled by the other party in 
recent history. All of these factors buttress the independence of the Court and, because 
judicial independence was secure, the Court was free to decide Gonzales in a way 
consistent with the preferences of the conservative majority of justices on the Court.  
From an empirical perspective, however, Gonzales actually undermines many 
strategic accounts of judicial review. Many scholars have proposed and tested 
hypotheses that when some mechanism increases the independence of a court, there will 
be a direct, additive increase in the exercise of judicial review: both in the probability 
that a court will strike a given statute and the aggregate number of statutes struck down 
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in a given period of time (Vanberg 2001, 2005, Rios-Figueroa 2007, Clark 2009, 2011, 
Carrubba et al 2015).  But the Court chose to uphold the ban rather than strike it down. If 
the hypotheses stated and tested by these scholars reflected their true views, then 
Gonzales would be inconsistent with these strategic theories. Indeed, these empirical 
hypotheses contradict the main thesis of Epstein and Knight (1997), which posits that 
strategic considerations condition the role of ideology and jurisprudence on judicial 
decisions. 
The consequences of this mismatch in theory and empirics are far-reaching. 
Modelling judicial independence as a direct predictor of judicial review can undermine 
empirical tests of both the influence of both ideological preferences and judicial 
independence in a court’s probability of striking down a statute. This is especially true 
for courts that often review statutes they are likely to uphold, such as the U.S. Supreme 
Court. This creates a large potential for Type 2 error in previous studies and complicates 
both future research and replication efforts. Indeed, it is unclear how many of the 
previous null findings in the literature are true nulls versus Type 2 error. 
This paper refines current practices of modelling the relationship between 
judicial independence and judicial review, matching the nuanced theories advanced by 
scholars with equally nuanced empirical models. I begin by examining the current 
literature on judicial independence, focusing particularly on how theoretical mechanisms 
influence a constitutional court’s decision to invalidate laws. I next highlight that the 
common yet underappreciated prediction in these theories that judicial independence 
does not simply encourage constitutional courts to strike down laws, but rather allows 
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their own ideological predispositions to guide their decisions in constitutional cases. I 
then support my claims by analyzing U.S. Supreme Court constitutional decisions on 
important federal statutes from 1949-2011.The analysis reveals that modelling judicial 
independence as a conditional predictor significantly improves model fit, corrects Type 
2 error in previous interpretations, and reveals that the U.S. Supreme Court is much 
more sensitive to fluctuations in judicial independence than scholars have previously 
known.  Finally, I conclude with how these results change our understanding of 
scholarly theories of judicial independence and judicial review. 
2.2. Judicial Independence and its Role in Judicial Review 
Judicial independence, broadly defined, is a political construction that allows 
judges to make decisions free from outside influence. As a latent concept, scholars have 
taken a wide variety of approaches to measurement in empirical research. Many 
operationalizations of judicial independence focus either on expert descriptions of courts 
(Stephenson 2003, Linzer and Staton 2015) or indicators that would allow judges to 
make decisions free from influence, such as the real salary of judges or the budgets 
provided to courts (Hayo and Voight 2007, Ura and Wohlfarth 2010). But many others 
focus on judicial review, arguing that a constitutional court’s invalidation of a statute, 
order, or other policy decision is indication of its independence from the other branches 
of government (Vanberg 2001, 2005, Rios-Figueroa 2007, Clark 2009, Carrubba et al 
2015). 
While many find the concept of judicial independence normatively appealing, 
independence is far from guaranteed even within a democracy. The U.S. Congress and 
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president, for example, can influence the Supreme Court by ignoring or circumventing 
previous decisions (Epstein and Knight 1997, Meernik and Ignagni 1997), starving the 
Court of resources like support staff and salary increases (Hayo and Voight 2007; Ura 
and Wohlfarth 2010), limiting the amount of discretion the Court has in determining its 
docket (Harvey 2013), pursuing constitutional changes that would damage it, or even 
impeach the justices (Whittington 2007). Yet while these forms of court-curbing were 
relatively common in the past (Kramer 2004, McGuire 2004), they rarely occur in the 
post-War U.S. The puzzle of why Congress and the president continue to tolerate 
judicial review of its own actions is intriguing and motivates a large literature base 
explaining judicial independence in general and judicial review in particular. 
 Scholars have identified a number of determinants of judicial independence. 
Perhaps the most important driver of judicial independence is the popularity of a court. 
Elected officials are mindful of public opinion, with some going as far as to describe 
them as “single-minded re-election seekers” (Mayhew 1974). They are fearful of 
engaging in activities that would cause them to lose support, which could threaten their 
chances in the next election. Courts in modern democracies often have broad support 
among their publics (Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998, Gibson, Caldiera, and Spence 
2003, Gibson and Caldiera 2009). This support may cause voters to abandon officials 
that engage in court-curbing, which in turn insulates courts from the other branches of 
government who are fearful of losing their jobs. In turn, constitutional courts are free to 
strike down laws regardless of government preferences (Stephenson 2004, Carruba 
2009). In the U.S. context, this view is advocated by supporters of the attitudinal model 
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of judicial decision-making, arguing that the “negative political consequences, electoral 
or otherwise, of limiting judicial independence far outweigh whatever short-run policy 
gains Congress might gain by reining in the Court,” which allows the Court to make 
decisions solely based on the members’ ideological preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 
pg. 94).  
More recent research shows, however, that that even the Supreme Court is wary 
of declines in public opinion when deciding to invalidate laws. Clark (2009, 2011) 
shows that the Court invalidates fewer laws when the number of court-curbing bills 
increases, a signal of the Court’s popularity. Ura and his coauthors similarly show that 
the Court’s popularity relative to Congress influences how both institutions approach 
their interactions with one another (Ura and Wohlfarth 2010, Merrill, Conway, and Ura 
2017). Additional comparative evidence shows that constitutional courts are vulnerable 
to punishment when support is low (Helmke 2010, Helmke and Staton 2011). 
Vanberg (2001, 2005) argues that transparency in the political environment 
moderates the relationship between popularity and judicial review. Public attention to a 
particular case makes it more difficult for elected officials to circumvent rulings. If the 
public is not attentive, however, elected officials do not fear public backlash and are free 
to act as they wish even if the court is popular, a problem if a court’s preferred decision 
in a case were to bring it in conflict with elected officials. Similarly, if the public is not 
attentive to a court more generally, executives and legislatures have no incentive to 
support judicial independence and instead will punish courts that make decisions out-of-
step with their preferences. In a number of interviews, Vanberg (2005) shows that both 
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German high court judges and members of parliament are keenly aware of the political 
nature of their relationship, with members of parliament adding that they are careful to 
avoid public scrutiny when attempting to evade court decisions. In quantitative analysis, 
he also shows that the German constitutional court is more likely to strike laws in salient 
cases, a finding supported by additional analysis in Mexico (Staton 2006, 2010). Cross-
national analysis also finds that countries with higher degrees of press freedom also have 
more independent judiciaries (Hayo and Voight 2007, Melton and Ginsburg 2014). 
Formal protections for constitutional courts, or de jure judicial independence, 
also help secure judicial independence. Formal protections such as salary minimums and 
guaranteed term length remove tools that can be used to punish a court if it makes a 
politically unpopular decision. This in turn insulates a court from political pressure and 
secures judicial independence (Hayo and Voight 2007, Melton and Ginsburg 2014). 
Supporters of the attitudinal model argue that these formal protections help insulate the 
Court, allowing it to make decisions solely based on their preferences (Segal 1997). But 
analysis over a long time horizon indicate that the Court’s institutional support was not 
always so high and, as a result, it invalidated fewer laws (McGuire 2004). Cross-national 
evidence also finds that protected constitutional courts are more likely to strike down 
statutes in politically unfavorable circumstances (Carrubba et al 2015). 
Political fragmentation can also provide the independence courts need to exercise 
judicial review. Modeling the U.S., many modern democracies have a separation-of-
powers system in which the ability to govern is divided between multiple political 
entities, like a separately elected executive and legislature. When these various political 
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bodies are not controlled by the same governing coalition, a government may be unable 
to retaliate against a court that invalidates its policies and a court is empowered to 
exercise judicial review (Rios-Figueroa 2007). Evidence supporting the political 
fragmentation hypothesis is mixed, with observational evidence indicating additive 
influence, moderating influence, and even no influence whatsoever (Rios-Figueroa 2007, 
Carruba 2015, Helmke 2010). 
In some ways, political fragmentation can be seen as a more basic formulation of 
Marks’ separation of powers model (2015).1 Marks explained why Congress would 
tolerate a statutory Supreme Court decision inconsistent with its preferences. Later 
scholars extended the logic to constitutional decisions (Bergara, Richman, and Spiller 
2003; Spiller and Gely 1992, Gely and Spiller 1990). If the pivotal actors in the policy-
making process, such as the median member of the House, the median member of the 
Senate, and the president, all support a law under review, the Court will not try to 
invalidate it for fear of non-implementation and potential backlash. But if a single 
pivotal member opposes the law, the court is free to strike it down so long as doing so 
would not result in a policy environment more extreme than the ideal policy of the 
dissenting pivotal member(s). There is considerable debate as to whether it has empirical 
support; proponents of the attitudinal model in particular argue for a negligible 
relationship (Segal 1997, Segal and Spaeth 2002, Owens 2011, Segal, Westerland, and 
                                                 
1 This paper went unpublished for many years, leading to an inconsistent timing of publications. 
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Lindquist 2011, Spiller and Gely 1992, Bergara, Richman, and Spiller 2003, Hall and 
Ura 2015). 
Insurance theory argues that judicial independence will be greater when political 
competition is high (Stephenson 2003). Competition creates uncertainty for government 
officials evaluating whether they will be able to keep power. Fearing extreme policies by 
the opposition, governments support judicial review as an insurance mechanism were 
they to lose power. This fear of the opposition encourages governments to tolerate 
judicial review of its own actions and, subsequently, empowers courts to strike laws as 
they see fit. Insurance theory has considerable empirical support, both qualitative and 
quantitative (see Vanberg 2015 for a review). 
2.3. Independence as a Moderator of Preferences  
As mentioned earlier, judicial review has been used as an indicator of judicial 
independence. To be sure, a truly independent court must not be afraid to strike down the 
decisions of other actors. But despite its correlation with independence, it is by no means 
a valid indicator of the concept. Scholars have long noted that governments may desire 
for courts to strike down laws under certain conditions (Rogers 2001, Whittington 2005). 
Striking down a law, therefore, is not a perfect indicator of an independent court, as it 
could just as easily be a court bowing to the pressure of another branch of government 
(Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla 2008). In a similar vein, failing to strike a law is not 
necessarily an indication of a weak judiciary. As the introduction illustrates, just because 
the U.S. Supreme Court is independent does not mean it strikes down every law that 
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comes before its docket; sometimes, they uphold laws that are consistent with the 
judges’ preferences. 
This last part is an underappreciated prediction made by a number of formal 
models of judicial review. Consider Mark’s separation of powers model (2015). Many 
scholars interpret this model to mean that when the elected branches are supportive of a 
particular law, the Court should be less likely to strike it down if it comes under the 
Court’s consideration (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011).  Conversely, the Court 
should be more likely to strike down a law when at least one pivotal elected official 
opposes the law. I argue, however, that this characterization of the model omits an 
important relationship. When a pivotal actor opposes a law under review, the court is 
free to strike down the law as constitutional and move the status quo towards its 
ideological preferences. But if the law reflects the preferences of the median member of 
the Court, then the Court will uphold the law as constitutional and force political 
opponents to repeal it using normal legislative means. The Court is not forced to strike 
laws, but rather can “vote its own preferences” (Bergara, Richman, and Spiller 2003).  
A similar account can be given for Vanberg’s model of political transparency 
(2001, 2005). A typical description of the model’s equilibria states that when a court is 
sufficiently popular and operates in an environment of political transparency, it is more 
likely to invalidate legislation (Staton 2006). But this characterization misses an 
important part of the equilibria. Assuming that the government supports a statute under 
review, a court with divergent preferences to the legislature will strike down a statute 
when both popularity and transparency are high; otherwise, that court will uphold a 
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statute out of fear of court-curbing. A court with convergent preferences to legislature, 
however, will always uphold a statute under review regardless of its popularity and 
transparency. The importance of this theoretical prediction is most obvious when 
phrased in light of a court’s ideological preferences: when a court is sufficiently 
protected from potential court curbing, it is free to act upon its preferences. When those 
constraints are not high, however, it will ignore its preferences and instead choose to 
uphold legislation.  
I argue that none of the mechanisms of judicial independence discussed above 
imply simple direct effects on a constitutional court’s decision to strike down a statute, 
as previous studies have assumed in their empirical models. Rather, these mechanisms 
condition the effect that a court’s preferences have on striking a statute: the effect of 
preferences should be strongest when a court is protected from court curbing and that 
effect should decline as the court becomes more vulnerable. This leads to a general 
hypothesis: 
Conditional Preference Hypothesis: The relationship between the ideological 
preferences of a constitutional court towards striking a statute and the probability 
that the court will strike down a statute is conditioned by the degree of 
independence that court has from other branches of government, with greater 
levels of independence leading to a more positive relationship. 
While previous studies of judicial independence recognize that it is influential in 
a court’s decision to strike down laws, many of them do not explicitly state its role in 
conditioning the effect of court’s preferences in judicial decision-making (Vanberg 
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2001, 2005, Staton 2006, 2010, Clark 2009, 2011, Rios-Figueroa 2007, Carruba et al 
2015). Likewise, their empirical models do not account for this conditioning relationship 
and instead test additive relationships between judicial independence and judicial 
review. This approach can uncover relationships if a constitutional court is generally 
predisposed to strike a law, as considered by some authors (Rios-Figueroa 2007). Yet 
most scholars are silent on the issue. The implied theoretical approach of most prior 
research can be summarized as: 
Additive Independence Hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between the 
degree of independence of a constitutional court and the probability that the court 
will strike down a statute. 
Additionally, the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making, as applied to judicial 
review, makes a distinct additive prediction. Proponents of the attitudinal model argue 
that the positive relationship between the Court’s ideological predispositions and the 
ultimate decision in a case are constant. Because the Court is sufficiently protected, 
variance in the level of independence is inconsequential to judicial decision-making.2 
This leads to an additional hypothesis: 
Additive Preference Hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between the 
preferences of a constitutional court towards striking a statute and the probability 
that the court will strike down a statute. 
                                                 
2 While Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist (2011) recognize a general notion of strategic interaction in their 
article, their inferences are based upon a model when the Court’s support for a statute has a constant effect 
on its probability to strike. 
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2.4. Research Design 
In order to test the above hypotheses, I need to analyze a set of constitutional 
court decisions with measures of both the court’s preferences towards invalidating a 
particular statute and different mechanisms that secure judicial independence. The U.S. 
Supreme Court provides an excellent test case for two reasons. First, the U.S. Supreme 
Court is considered one of the most independent courts in the world, as shown by its 
consistently high levels of legitimacy and its long history of making decisions according 
to the attitudinal model (Gibson 2008, Segal and Spaeth 2002). This general high level 
of independence makes it difficult to find evidence for the Additive Independence 
Hypothesis, in turn making it a prime subject to test the Conditional Preference 
Hypothesis. Indeed, the difficulty in finding evidence that independence influences the 
decision-making of the Court makes it one of the most conservative tests of my theory 
and makes evidence that supports my theory all the more compelling. Second, the Court 
is the subject of a wealth of research on the ideological preferences of its members over 
a long period of time, with a particular emphasis on the measures of justice ideal points 
(Segal and Cover 1989, Martin and Quinn 2002, Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland 
2007, Bailey 2008). While comparative research efforts are growing in their ability to 
collect case data across countries, comparable ideal point estimates for courts or their 
judges are still unavailable. For these reason, I analyze a subset of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions from 1949-2011. 
Rather than solely focusing on U.S. Supreme Court decisions, however, this 
analysis draws on a statute-centered approach of previous studies (Hall and Ura 2015, 
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Harvey and Friedman 2009, 2006). The study of judicial review inevitably leads to 
studying court decisions. Solely studying them in presence of a discretionary docket, 
however, can lead to a selection bias as strategic interactions may happen at the 
certiorari stage (Friedman 2006). This can negatively impact our ability to make 
inferences, meaning we must go beyond simply looking at decisions and look at the 
statutes which the decisions are about. Thus, the unit of observation in this analysis are 
federal statutes. Of course, there are difficulties with looking at all federal statutes. 
Collection of the data would be a monumental task and would thus limit analysis to a 
small time period. As a middle ground, I analyze a subset of statutes enacted between 
1949 and 2011. The subset is whether a law is landmark legislation, as defined by 
Mayhew (2005). This results in 368 statutes, with writs of certiorari granted to 
constitutional challenges 149 times and subsequent invalidations 55 times.3 
In order to account for potential selection effects in the merits stage, as well as 
examine interesting relationships at the certiorari stage, the model used in this analysis is 
a Heckman probit model. The first stage is a model of the Court’s decision to hear a 
challenge of an important statute in a given year. The second stage is a model of the 
Court’s decision to invalidate, in part or in whole, the statute on constitutional grounds. 
This model allows us to control for potential sample selection bias at the merits stage, 
though it does not allow for us to entangle what social processes are governing whether a 
                                                 
3 Due to constraints on relevant independent variables, only 148 of the 149 Supreme Court decisions are 
analyzed in the data. 
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statute is granted a constitutional challenge.4 All variables to be described in this analysis 
are included in both the first and second stage, except those variables that are specific to 
Court decisions rather than statutes or the extant political environment.  
The crucial independent variable in this analysis is the court’s preferences 
towards a law. To measure the court’s ideological preferences, I use a combination of 
Bailey’s (2013) ideal point estimates of justices’ ideology and the direction of the 
decision classification from the Supreme Court Database. If striking a statute was 
consistent with the median member of the court’s ideological predisposition, then the 
observation is assigned the absolute value of the median member’s ideal point. If not, 
then the observation is assigned the negative of the absolute value of the median 
member’s ideal point. All cases where the ideological implications of a decision were 
unclear were coded as zero. This results in a measure of the court’s attitudes towards the 
case where positive values indicate the court is ideologically inclined to striking and 
negative values indicate the court is ideologically opposed to striking. 
The use of the direction of the decision variable from the Supreme Court 
Database makes for a particularly compelling test of my theory. Harvey (2013) argues 
that the strong evidence supporting the attitudinal model in the U.S. Supreme Court can 
be explained, at least in part, by confirmation bias in the coding of the variable. If this is 
true, my incorporation of this variable biases my subsequent analysis in favor of finding 
support for the attitudinal model and away from my own theory. Finding evidence that 
                                                 
4 The certiorari process is influenced by a number of actors, including litigants, lower court judges, 
political elites, and the justices themselves. 
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supports the Conditional Preference Hypothesis in the face of such a conservative test, 
then, would provide compelling support for my theory. 
Aside from the court’s ideological predispositions, I also need measures of the 
various mechanisms that secure judicial independence.5 I include two measures of the 
Court’s popularity in the analysis. First, I include a measure of the Court’s popularity 
relative to Congress, which Ura and his coauthors argue is an important consideration in 
legislative-judicial interactions (Ura and Wohlfarth 2010, Merrill, Conway, and Ura 
2017). The General Social Survey asks respondents to rate the people running different 
government institutions on a three-point scale, first measured in 1973.6 My measure is 
the average approval for the Court minus the average support for Congress in the 
previous year. Second, Clark (2009, 2011) argues that court-curbing bills introduced in 
Congress is a function of public discontent for the Court. I adopt his measure of the 
number of court-curbing bills introduced in Congress in the previous year; the data 
begins in 1973. 
Vanberg (2001, 2005) has a number of measures of political transparency that 
should protect politically popular courts like the U.S. Supreme Court. An easily 
understood policy area should be more transparent than more complex ones. To code 
statute easiness, I adapt Vanberg’s (2001) complexity measure to this analysis. It is a 
binary measure with any statute whose subject matter dealt with economic regulation, 
                                                 
5 One mechanism of judicial independence could not be operationalized in this dataset. The de jure 
protections afforded to members of the Court has remained stable over the Post-War era and is thus not 
included in this analysis. 
6 The measure has not been asked annually. In years where the data is missing, it is imputed using the 
average of the two most proximate years. 
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state-mandated social insurance, civil servant compensation, taxation, federal budget 
issues, or campaign finance is coded as complex and given a 0. All others are coded as 
easy and given a 1. Additionally, Vanberg argues that whether a case has oral arguments 
is a good indicator of transparency. While this measure works well in the German 
context, it is less helpful for the U.S. Supreme Court where cases have oral arguments. 
Instead, I adopt Epstein and Segal’s (2000) measure of case saliency as another measure 
of transparency. It is a binary measure where a 1 indicates that the decision was reported 
on the front page of the New York Times and 0 otherwise. 
In order to test Marks’ separation of powers model, I adopt a measure in the 
literature that estimates whether the current government supports or opposes a given 
statute under review (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011, Hall and Ura 2015). I 
collect the original roll call votes for each public law from VoteView (Lewis et al 2017). 
Using logit, I then regress these roll call votes on the Common Space Score of Members 
of Congress and the president (Poole 1998). In order to be consistent with other 
measures of independence in the study, I run a logit on a vote to oppose the law rather 
than a vote to support the law. Using the resulting model coefficients, I can then predict 
the probability that a future Member of Congress opposes a law using their Common 
Space Score. Note that for those laws passed unanimously or via voice votes in both 
chambers, there is no variation to run regression models. In these instances, the predicted 
opposition for all future officials is 0. I then identify pivotal actors in the policymaking 
process, relying on the insights of Krehbiel (1998), and record the maximum level of 
predicted opposition to a statute from any of the pivotal actors. I adopt three different 
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pivot models: the floor median model, the Senate filibuster model, and the party 
gatekeeping model. Each of these models are outlined in more detail in Hall and Ura 
(2015). The resulting measure gives the probability that the most hostile pivotal actor 
opposes the law based on their ideology, as measured by Common Space scores. 
Insurance theory argues that political competition protects the court because 
governments fear extreme legislation from the opposition once they are in power. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to test this theory directly when only examining a single 
political system like the U.S., especially since it has been characterized by competitive 
elections since the post-War era. An indirect test of this theory, however, is possible 
even in a single system. Insurance theory argues that fear of future opposition legislation 
constrains current governments to support judicial review. This implies that the current 
government and its opposition disagree on policy. But when the government party and 
opposition party agree on policy, however, insurance theory buckles because being 
supplanted from power will not result in policy change. Thus, the current government 
should be constrained to respect judicial review in partisan matters but not bipartisan 
ones. I measure the partisanship of a statute as the absolute value of the proportion of 
House Republicans that voted for a statute minus the proportion of House Democrats 
that voted for the statute. This results in a continuous measure that assigns a 0 when both 
parties equally support a statute and a 1 when a statute passes on a strict party-line vote. 
The political fragmentation literature argues that when political power is divided 
among opposing entities, courts should be protected from court-curbing. The American 
system is notably marked by separation of powers, but there is variation in whether those 
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powers are unified under a single political party. In order to test my theory on political 
fragmentation, I adopt I include a dummy measure of in which a 1 indicates divided 
partisan control of the House, Senate, and presidency and a 0 indicates unified. 
In addition to these variables of interest, I include a number of controls. A 
growing body of literature shows that Court decisions are also influenced by ideological 
tilt of public opinion (Mishler and Sheehan 1993, McGuire and Stimson 2004). 
Individual perceptions of the legitimacy of the Court are also influenced by their 
approval of particular decisions (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003). To control for 
these relationships in my analysis, I use a combination of Stimson’s (1999) public mood 
and the direction of the decision from the Supreme Court database. First, I mean-center a 
year lag of public mood for the time period of my analysis so that positive values 
indicate a liberal public in that time-period and negative values indicate a conservative 
public. Then, as with the measure of the court’s attitude, I assign an observation the 
absolute value of the transformed public mood if striking is aligned with the public’s 
ideological predisposition. I assign the negative of the absolute value of the transformed 
public mood if striking is against the public’s ideological interests. Positive values mean 
the public wants a strike and negative values mean the public does not. 
I also control model unit effects and the temporal structure of the data. I include 
two-way fixed effects in both stages of the analysis. The first set controls for the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court who 1) managed the Court for the majority of a given year 
in the first stage of the analysis, and 2) managed the Court when it decided a particular 
case the second stage. The second set controls of the policy area of a given statute; 
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besides a miscellaneous category, these policy areas are agriculture, the budget, civil 
rights, consumer protection, crime, education, energy and the environment, foreign 
affairs, good governance, minimum wage, regulation, Social Security, taxes, 
transportation, and welfare.7 Finally, I also include cubic polynomials of the number of 
years since a constitutional challenge was granted against a statute to control for the 
duration dependence in the first stage of the analysis, following the advice of Carter and 
Signorino (2010); these polynomials also serve as the instrument necessary to estimate a 
Heckman model.  
2.5. Analysis 
The analysis proceeds in two parts. The analysis is first conducted with a simple 
additive model in which mechanisms that secure judicial independence are included but 
not interacted with court ideology. The results of this analysis are contained in Tables 1 
and 2. Importantly, court ideology is a robust and relatively stable predictor of whether 
the court will strike down a statute in the models: a one-unit increase in the court’s 
ideological predisposition to striking down a statute results in roughly 20% increase in 
the probability of striking in the sample. To help illustrate this example, Justice 
O’Connor retired in 2005 as the median justice on the Court. Her replacement, Justice 
Alito, was decidedly more conservative: on the Bailey ideal point scale, his first ideal 
point measure in 2006 was roughly one unit larger than O’Connor’s in 2005. Thus if 
                                                 
7 In the popularity models where data is not available until 1973, a few categories could not be included in 
the analysis due to a lack of variation: consumer protection, foreign affairs, and welfare. Consumer 
protection was folded into the regulation category, while foreign affairs and welfare were folded into the 
miscellaneous category. 
 26 
 
Alito had become the median justice after replacing O’Connor, the Court would be 20% 
more likely to strike down liberal statutes and uphold conservative statutes.8 This result 
supports the Additive Preference Hypothesis.  
 
Table 2-1: Heckman Probit Model of Additive Independence and Judicial Review  
Stage 2: Invalidations of 
important federal statutes 
that are challenged 
Relative Court 
Popularity 
Court-
Curbing 
Bills 
Statute 
Easiness 
Case 
Salience 
Court Ideology -0.26 
(0.52) 
-0.25 
(0.53) 
1.00** 
(0.34) 
0.77** 
(0.32) 
Independence 2.22 
(1.99) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-1.24 
(0.75) 
0.91** 
(0.37) 
Public Ideology 0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
Policy Area Fixed Effects 10.81 11.39 15.51 17.75 
Temporal 
Fixed Effects 
0.89 3.46 2.55 4.68 
Stage 1: Challenges to 
important federal statutes 
    
Independence -0.38 
(0.55) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.26 
(0.12) 
- 
Policy Fixed Area Effects 70.30** 70.20** 82.83** 78.94** 
Chief Justice 
Fixed Effects 
8.03* 8.09* 9.70* 9.53* 
Cubic Polynomials of 
Duration Dependence 
62.46** 63.40** 59.22** 59.22** 
LR Test of Independent 
Equations 
0.50 0.54 0.51 0.32 
N Stage 1 10406 10406 12051 12051 
N Stage 2 118 118 148 148 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, one-tailed tests used where possible 
Grouped Coefficients report Wald Test of Joint Significance 
Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
                                                 
8 While Alito did not become the new Court median when O’Connor retired, the median of the Court has 
been known to drastically shift with a single retirement. The retirement of Justice Warren and his 
replacement with Justice Burger created a similarly large shift; the retirement of Justice Kennedy and his 
replacement with Justice Kavanaugh will likely see a similarly large shift. 
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In contrast with court ideology, however, the various mechanisms of judicial 
independence are not statistically significant. The sole exception is the model of case 
salience. In line with the expectations of the Additive Independence Hypothesis, the 
coefficient positive and statistically significant: in the sample, the discrete change of 
moving nonsalient to salient results in a roughly 30% increase in the probability of 
striking a statute. The lack of statistical significance the other eight mechanisms of 
judicial independence tested, however, casts doubt on the Additive Independence 
Hypothesis. While a lack of statistical significance does not necessarily indicate a 
negligible effect, at minimum it does indicate that the data does not support the Additive 
Independence Hypothesis (Rainey 2014). The results for court popularity, transparency, 
and political fragmentation are either partial or total failures of replication. In addition, 
the analysis would also fail to find evidence for an implication of insurance theory. Were 
the analysis to end here, one would question whether the mechanisms of popularity, 
transparency, and political fragmentation, for whatever reason, do not hold up as well in 
American context or if there is a problem with previous or current analysis. 
In addition to the analysis relevant to the articulated hypotheses, there a number 
of other relevant pieces of information to be gleaned from the tables. The public’s 
ideology is a relatively stable and appreciable predictor of Supreme Court decisions: a 
standard deviation increase in the public’s predisposition to strike leads to a 6% increase 
in the probability the Court will strike a law. Additionally, some measures of 
independence are statistically significant in the first stage of the equation, indicating that 
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they have a net-effect on the certiorari process. Specifically, there is a robust replication 
that the level of opposition to a statute among pivotal political actors is positively related 
to probability that the Court will grant certiorari to a constitutional challenge to that 
statute (Hall and Ura 2015). The level of partisan division of a statute is also positively 
related to the probability the Court will grant certiorari, likely driven by the strong 
correlation between partisan and ideological support for statutes.  
While individual coefficients of the two-way fixed effects and the cubic 
polynomials are not reported, Wald tests of their joint significance by group are reported. 
Both sets of fixed effects are statistically significant in the first stage, but not the second. 
The cubic polynomials are also statistically significant. This is likely driven by the 
discrepancy in degrees of freedom in the first and second stages. Even so, the p-values 
for the policy area fixed effects and the cubic polynomials are statistically significant at 
the 0.001 level, indicating there is more than just sample size considerations driving 
these results. Also worth noting is that the likelihood-ratio test of independent equations 
all fail to reject the null, indicating there is no evidence of the sample selection concerns 
championed by Friedman (2006), though such tests do not definitively disprove their 
existence. 
There are a few substantive observations we can glean from these control 
variables. First, the Court is much more likely to grant certiorari in some policy areas 
than others: the Court is more likely to hear cases on crime, good governance, and Social 
Security relative to the miscellaneous category and is less likely to hear cases on welfare 
and foreign affairs. Second, the Court is much more likely to hear a challenge to a law 
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right after it passes rather than waiting long periods of time, indicating that statutes with 
dubious constitutionality are considered by the Court swiftly. 
 
Table 2-2: Heckman Probit Model of Additive Independence and Judicial Review, 
Continued 
Stage 2: Invalidations 
of important federal 
statutes that are 
challenged 
Floor 
Median 
Model 
Senate 
Filibuster 
Model 
Party 
Gatekeeping 
Model 
Partisan 
Vote 
Political 
Fragmentation 
Court Ideology 0.81** 
(0.30) 
0.80** 
(0.31) 
0.81** 
(0.28) 
0.78** 
(0.32) 
0.88** 
(0.31) 
Independence -0.32 
(0.45) 
-0.41 
(0.43) 
-0.23 
(0.47) 
-0.23 
(0.47) 
0.55 
(0.34) 
Public Ideology 0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
Policy Area 
Fixed Effects 
16.37 16.89 15.98 15.98 15.03 
Chief Justice 
Fixed Effects 
3.32 3.51 3.22 3.22 3.05 
Stage 1: Challenges 
to important federal 
statutes 
     
Independence 0.40** 
(0.13) 
0.37** 
(0.13) 
0.41** 
(0.12) 
0.24* 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
Policy Area  
Fixed Effects 
81.85*
* 
81.51** 82.06** 78.86** 79.46** 
Chief Justice 
Fixed Effects 
10.23* 10.43* 11.46** 11.14* 9.27* 
Cubic Polynomials 
of Duration 
Dependence 
58.28*
* 
58.13** 57.93** 56.65** 59.92** 
LR Test of 
Independent 
Equations 
1.13 1.21 0.99 1.01 0.45 
N Stage 1 11975 11975 11975 12051 12051 
N Stage 2 148 148 148 148 148 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, one-tailed tests used where possible 
Grouped Coefficients report Wald Test of Joint Significance 
Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
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The results in Tables 3 and 4 are similar to the models as the Tables 1 and 2, but 
this time including an interaction term between court ideology and the independence 
variables. There is little change in the control variables and cubic polynomials in the 
data. The likelihood ratio tests of independent equations also provide no evidence of 
selection effects. Importantly, the likelihood ratio tests comparing the models in Tables 3 
and 4 to their counterparts in 1 and 2 are statistically significant. Most of the likelihood 
ratio tests in Table 4 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level and, as the replication 
materials detail, the likelihood ratio tests for case salience and Court popularity are just 
outside the realm of statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. These 
tests provide support for the Conditional Preference Hypothesis relative to the other 
hypotheses. 
Like the previous models, the coefficient for the various mechanisms of judicial 
independence are rarely statistically significant and normally centered around zero. 
Unlike in the previous models, the coefficient for court ideology has wide variation: the 
coefficient almost doubles in the political fragmentation model, is statistically 
insignificant and centered on zero in the pivotal support models, and large and negative 
in the Court popularity model. These results are inconsistent with the Additive 
Preference and Additive Independence Hypotheses, which would predict positive, 
statistically significant coefficients for each set of constitutive variables and a 
statistically insignificant interaction term centered on zero. In contrast, six of the nine 
interaction terms are positive and statistically significant. This is again consistent with 
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the Conditional Preference Hypothesis: as the level of independence increases, the 
Court’s ideological preferences play a stronger role in their decisions. 
 
Table 2-3: Heckman Probit Model of Conditional Independence and Judicial 
Review 
Stage 2: Invalidations of 
important federal statutes 
that are challenged 
Court 
Popularity 
Court-
Curbing 
Bills 
Statute 
Easiness 
Case 
Salience 
Court Ideology -3.97 
(2.02) 
-0.97 
(0.75) 
0.65 
(0.44) 
-0.02 
(0.50) 
Independence 2.56 
(2.06) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-1.12 
(0.73) 
0.96** 
(0.38) 
Court Ideology x 
Independence 
9.90* 
(5.43) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
0.64 
(0.56) 
1.23* 
(0.69) 
Public Ideology 0.04 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
Policy Area Fixed Effects 12.54 12.48 12.98 17.50 
Chief Justice 
Fixed Effects 
1.28 4.09 2.91 4.65 
Stage 1: Challenges to 
important federal statutes 
    
Independence 0.39 
(0.55) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.13* 
(0.07) 
- 
Policy Area Fixed Effects 70.32** 70.19** 82.82** 78.95** 
Chief Justice 
Fixed Effects 
8.05* 8.02* 9.73* 9.52* 
Cubic Polynomials of 
Duration Dependence 
62.43** 63.51** 59.24** 59.86** 
LR Test of Independent 
Equations 
0.67 0.04 0.49 1.13 
LR Test of Multiplicative 
Specification 
2.66 2.18 0.94 3.67 
N Stage 1 10406 10406 12051 12051 
N Stage 2 118 118 148 148 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, one-tailed tests used where possible 
Grouped Coefficients report Wald Test of Joint Significance 
Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
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Table 2-4: Heckman Probit Model of Conditional Independence and Judicial 
Review, Continued 
Stage 2: 
Invalidations of 
important federal 
statutes that are 
challenged 
Floor 
Median 
Model 
Senate 
Filibuster 
Model 
Party 
Gatekeeping 
Model 
Partisan 
Vote 
Political 
Fragmentation 
Court Ideology -0.49 
(0.56) 
-0.90 
(0.72) 
-1.22 
(0.82) 
-1.56 
(0.75) 
1.32** 
(0.44) 
Independence 0.10 
(0.59) 
0.18 
(0.65) 
0.39 
(0.69) 
1.48 
(0.92) 
0.48 
(0.33) 
Court Ideology x 
Independence 
4.34* 
(2.13) 
5.30* 
(2.53) 
5.60* 
(2.44) 
9.75** 
(3.29) 
-0.96 
(0.58) 
Public Ideology 0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
Policy Area 
Fixed Effects 
21.54 22.55 21.74 25.18* 14.26 
Chief Justice 
Fixed Effects 
3.69 2.97 2.40 6.31 3.19 
Stage 1: Challenges 
to important federal 
statutes 
     
Independence 0.40** 
(0.13) 
0.37** 
(0.13) 
0.41** 
(0.12) 
0.24* 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
Policy Area 
Fixed Effects 
81.85** 81.54** 82.11** 78.85** 79.40** 
Chief Justice 
Fixed Effects 
10.26* 10.39* 11.41** 11.05* 9.34* 
Cubic 
Polynomials of 
Duration 
Dependence 
58.20** 57.94** 57.64** 57.23** 60.26** 
LR Test of 
Independent 
Equations 
0.98 0.73 0.63 0.40 0.84 
LR Test of 
Multiplicative 
Specification 
7.51** 10.62** 7.50** 20.74** 2.21 
N Stage 1 11975 11975 11975 12051 12051 
N Stage 2 148 148 148 148 148 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, one-tailed tests used where possible 
Grouped Coefficients report Wald Test of Joint Significance 
Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
 33 
 
To aid in interpreting both the probit model and the interaction terms, Figures 1 
and 2 present the average marginal effect of court ideology at the empirical minimum 
and maximum levels of independence in the data (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013). The 
results in Figure 1 provide some support the Conditional Preference Hypothesis. When 
the Court is popular relative to Congress, a one-unit increase in the court’s ideological 
predisposition to strike results in a 50% increase in the probability of striking in the 
sample, a relationship which disappears when the Court and Congress have similar 
levels of popularity. Similarly, when the Court considers a case that is salient to the 
public, a one-unit increase in court’s ideological predisposition to strike translates into 
roughly a 40% increase in the probability of striking; this finding disappears for non-
salient cases.  
The results in Figure 2 more strongly support the Conditional Preference 
Hypothesis. When all pivotal policymaking members support a statute, for any of the 
pivotal policymaker models, court ideology does not have a statistically significant 
influence on the court’s decision to strike a statute. But when a single pivotal member is 
opposed to a statute, a one-unit increase in the court’s ideological predisposition to strike 
translates into roughly a staggering 90% increase in the probability of striking in the 
sample. The partisan vote model results are even more extreme. For a bipartisan or 
nonpartisan statute, court ideology actually has a small negative effect that, with a two-
sided test, is statistically significant. For a strictly partisan statute, however, a one-unit 
increase in court ideology results in a 100% increase in the Court’s probability to strike, 
an empirical prediction that is literally off the charts. These extreme results indicate that 
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even small changes in the ideological disposition of the Court can have huge 
consequences on the Court’s propensity to strike a law when the Court is independent. 
These results disappear, however, when the Court is not independent. 
 
Figure 2-1: Average Marginal Effect of Court Ideology of Table 3, at the Empirical 
Minimum and Maximum Levels of Independence (90% Confidence Intervals) 
 
 
 
The court-curbing model and political fragmentation model do not support the 
Conditional Preference Hypothesis: the models’ relevant coefficients are not statistically 
significant, and the direction of the relationship (as well as the interaction term) is in the 
opposite direction as would be expected by theory. While the results do not necessarily 
show that court-curbing does not play a role in the Court’s decision to strike a statute, as 
detailed by Rainey (2014), it does cast some doubt on these theories. The easiness of a 
statute’s policy area also does not support the model, but this is likely due to the policy 
area fixed effects included in the model. There is little variation left for the statute 
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easiness variable to exhibit, and the mechanism supports the Conditional Preference 
Hypothesis when these fixed effects are removed. 
 
Figure 2-2: Average Marginal Effect of Court Ideology of Table 4, at the Empirical 
Minimum and Maximum Levels of Independence 
 
 
 
2.6. Discussion 
This paper provides strong evidence that judicial independence is a conditional 
predictor of judicial review, rather than additive predictors as tested in previous 
empirical models. Rather than encouraging the Court to strike down a statute or other 
government policy, as implied by previous empirical tests of theory, higher degrees of 
independence for the Court enables it to make decisions based on its own ideological 
predispositions, whether those predispositions support striking a policy or upholding it. 
As shown in the tests, the Court is remarkably sensitive to shifts in its independence; the 
finding is notable given the consistent evidence showing that the Court enjoys high 
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levels of legitimacy. This evidence is consistent with prior informal discussion of these 
theories but represents an improvement in both the clarity of the presentation and 
attempts in empirically modelling them. Indeed, many scholars previous work would 
either partially or fully fail to replicate absent this advance in empirical modelling. 
How might scholars approach the study of judicial independence and judicial 
decision-making differently in the future? There is a clear need for the integration of the 
preferences of judges into strategic accounts of judicial behavior, an easy step to take in 
almost all areas of American politics research. The call is notably more difficult for 
studies of other courts or comparative studies, where relatively fewer attempts have been 
made to measure the preferences of judges. Yet there if a clear framework for doing so 
following the Bayesian ideal point methods used by several scholars (Martin and Quinn 
2002, Bailey 2008). Indeed, as databases of decisions for non-U.S. courts becoming 
increasingly well-kept and available, this barrier is reduced until there is little excuse for 
not incorporating them. 
Independent of the methodological contribution of the paper, the substantive 
results of the empirical analysis make a couple of notable contributions to the literature. 
First, the analysis helps resolve a debate about the validity of Marks’ separation of 
powers model for U.S. Supreme Court decision-making. Segal and his coauthors have 
consistently found that the separation of powers model has no explanatory power on 
Supreme Court constitutional decisions (Segal and Spaeth 2002, Segal, Westerland, and 
Lindquist 2011, see also Hall and Ura 2015). But this seems to be due to empirical tests 
that restrict the government’s preferences over statutes under review to having a direct 
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effect on the decision to strike a law. When the government’s preferences are allowed to 
condition the effects of the Court’s ideological preferences, as the theory implies, then 
there are strong results consistent with both the theory and other research (Bergara, 
Richman, and Spiller 2003). 
Second, the analysis provides additional insight into the nature of political 
fragmentation. The analysis does not provide evidence that political fragmentation 
influences the Supreme Court’s decision to strike a law. It does, however, provide 
evidence that ideological and partisan divisions to a statute do influence the Court’s 
decision to strike. These two arguments are similar but have important differences. 
Implicit within the theory of political fragmentation is the idea that different political 
parties disagree and should be unable to cooperate to punish a constitutional court. 
While it is true in the U.S. that the parties have, to varying degrees, always had marked 
differences in ideology, this does not preclude their ability to agree on some issues and 
work together. Indeed, the majority of public laws considered in my empirical 
examination were passed by strong, bipartisan majorities. Political fragmentation does 
not seem to be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for a court to be protected. It is 
not necessary in that a party may disagree internally about an issue when it has full 
control of government, like the Democrats were on racial issues in the civil rights era, 
and it is not sufficient in that two opposing parties may agree on a particular issue and 
punish a constitutional court if it invalidates statutes on that issue. 
This study is not without limitations. As mentioned in a footnote, not all of the 
mechanisms for judicial independence are tested. The de jure protection afforded to 
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members of the Court has remained relatively stable over the Post-War era. This lack of 
variation prevents analysis of these theories in light of the arguments in this paper. 
Comparative analysis must be conducted in order to fully evaluate these theories. 
There is also a concern about the generalizability of the findings. The research 
design focuses on statutes that are regarded as important at the time of passage. For the 
most part, many are also considered landmark statutes in retrospective review. But the 
focus on important statutes excludes statutes with moderate to minor importance. In 
these cases, it’s entirely possible that the Additive Preference Hypothesis would hold 
because a government simply would not care about whether a minor statute was struck 
down. This would be consistent with some models of judicial independence, in which 
the cost of retaliating against a constitutional court is greater than the benefit received 
from reenacting a statute (Vanberg 2005). Still, the comparison of statutes with varying 
degrees of importance would be an interesting avenue for future research. 
Additional research should also be conducted on political competition and 
judicial review. This paper suggests a more nuanced understanding of insurance theory: 
political competition empowers judicial review of partisan statutes but not bipartisan 
ones. A crucial assumption made in insurance theory is that political parties have 
opposing policy desires. While true in many policy areas, it is not difficult to imagine 
values opposing political parties in democracies might share: democracy, capitalism, a 
strong national defense, etc. In these areas, governments may be less inclined to tolerate 
judicial review of its actions. Analysis of the American context supports this claim. 
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However, additional comparative analysis over a wider range of political contexts would 
provide more robust support for this argument.  
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3. PRESIDENTS, LEGISLATURES, AND MAJORITARIAN JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Political scientists have argued that the U.S. Supreme Court is a majoritarian 
institution in nature since at least Dahl’s seminal work on the matter (1957). Dahl 
originally argued this because the Court rarely invalidates laws passed by current elected 
officials, instead choosing to uphold laws or invalidate laws passed by previous 
administrations. This line of thought has since been extended by scholars who argue that 
judicial review itself can be majoritarian: elected officials sometimes prefer the Court to 
invalidate their laws rather than uphold them (Rogers 2001, Whittington 2005, 2007, 
Fox and Stephenson 2011). While there are many mechanism by which judicial review 
can be majoritarian, the underlying argument in the literature is the same: elected 
officials can achieve their policy goals by relying on the constitutional court’s ability to 
invalidate statutes rather than pursue policy change. 
Within the scholarship on majoritarian judicial review, however, there are two 
distinct strands. The first focuses on the benefits judicial review can provide to 
legislatures (Rogers 2001, Fox and Stephenson 2011). Legislatures are usually vested 
with policymaking authority in democracies, making them the most obvious 
beneficiaries of majoritarian judicial review. Importantly, these studies normally treat 
legislatures as if they were unitary institutions with sole policymaking authority. They 
often rely on game-theoretic analysis in order to elucidate their arguments. 
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The second strand of scholarship, primarily advanced by Whittington (2005, 
2007) explicitly focuses on the benefits judicial review can provide to executives. In 
particular, he argues that U.S. presidents, as elected officials with considerable interest 
and influence in policy outcomes, can benefit from majoritarian judicial review as well. 
Importantly, he advances a number of claims as why the Supreme Court might be 
motivated to advance the policy goals of the president, some of which are unique to that 
office. This strand of scholarship is usually supported by case studies. 
These two strands of scholarship are not necessarily competitive. Constitutional 
courts can generally support both legislators and executives when using judicial review, 
especially when there is policy agreement between the two branches on a particular 
issue. But policy agreement between branches of government is far from guaranteed in 
presidential systems. Furthermore, there are unique reasons why a constitutional court 
might support one branch over another driven by the design of those institutions. 
Legislatures provide material incentives and better represent public opinion; in contrast, 
the executive's unilateral control over the varied functions of its office allow for more 
targeted persuasion on a given issue. Given these differing incentives constitutional 
courts face when considering majoritarian judicial review, which branch of government 
does a court support? 
This papers joins these two separate strands of the literature into a 
comprehensive account of majoritarian judicial review that focuses on the structure of 
political institutions. I start by reviewing the general principals of majoritarian judicial 
review while also identifying the specific mechanisms in the literature. I next distinguish 
 48 
 
between legislative-focused and executive-focused majoritarian judicial review in 
presidential systems, highlighting why a constitutional court might prefer to advance the 
policy goals of legislators rather than the executive and vice versa. During this, I survey 
the evidence supporting majoritarian judicial review for each branch within the 
American context. I then craft a couple of hypotheses about how majoritarian judicial 
review should function and test them using a set of U.S. Supreme Court constitutional 
decisions on important federal statutes from 1951-2011. The analysis finds evidence for 
both executive-focused and legislative-focused judicial review, though the stronger 
evidence is certainly for the presidency. I close by discussing some limitations of the 
study and areas of future research. 
3.2. Motivations for Majoritarian Judicial Review 
Majoritarian theories of judicial review developed as a response to the long-
standing criticism that the U.S. Supreme Court is a countermajoritarian institution 
(Bickel 1986). Because unelected judges can use judicial review to invalidate the actions 
of elected officials, judicial review is illegitimate in a democratic society. This has led 
many positive scholars to study judicial independence; if judicial review is 
countermajoritarian, only independent courts can exercise it (Vanberg 2001, Stephenson 
2003). Majoritarian theories of judicial review argue that while the constitutional courts 
may issue the occasional countermajoritarian decision, elected officials tolerate them 
because of the benefits judicial review provides in advancing their policy goals. Elected 
officials, of course, have other tools to create policy change. In the right circumstances, 
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however, the prospect of a friendly court invalidating undesirable legislation may be 
preferable to direct action. 
There are a number of mechanisms by which elected officials can benefit from 
judicial review. Rogers (2001) argues that uncertainty in the political environment can 
make judicial review desirable for elected officials. When there is a large degree of 
uncertainty about the true policy consequences of a statute, legislatures will defer to the 
judgement of more informed, ideologically congruent constitutional courts. Courts can 
generally be thought of as having better information because it has access to the same 
information as elected officials plus the additional information gathered through the 
legal process, such as the post-enactment information gathered because of the “standing” 
doctrine in common law courts. 
Other majoritarian theories argue that elected officials might desire judicial 
review on divisive topics (Graber 1993, Whittington 2005). While political parties are 
organized around agreement on policy issues, there are times when certain issues can 
internally divide a party. Such issues threaten to tear apart a governing party if it came to 
blows, encouraging party leaders to allow a constitutional court to make the final 
decision on a statute even if it means allowing the court to strike down a statute. This 
can occur by either refusing to pass new legislation in favor of judicial action or 
nominally passing legislation with the expectation that the court will have the final say 
on the matter. 
Elected officials may also desire constitutional courts to use judicial review to 
address situations in which different officials disagree on a policy area. During times of 
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divided government, politicians may look to a constitutional court to overcome 
entrenched interests preventing new legislation or to undo the policy compromises 
necessary to achieve legislation. Similarly, dominant national coalitions may look to a 
court to enforce its policy agenda onto subnational entities with diverging preferences 
(Whittington 2005, 2007). Judicial review may provide a valuable means of 
policymaking when traditional means are unavailable. 
Judicial review can also create a moral hazard for elected officials (Salzberger 
1993, Whittington 2007, Fox and Stephenson 2011). Politicians in democracies are 
highly concerned with public opinion, with some going as far as to describe them as 
“single-minded re-election seekers” (Mayhew 1974). Sometimes, however, politicians 
may desire to veto bills or repeal statutes that are politically popular. In order to do so, 
they may instead rely on a constitutional court to strike a law, shifting the blame from 
themselves to an institution that is relatively insulated from public opinion. 
While the theoretical motivations for each of these mechanisms are distinct, they 
share a common, conditional structure. Specifically, judicial review has majoritarian 
benefits only when elected officials and a constitutional court share similar ideological 
preferences (Rogers 2001, Whittington 2005). Because a constitutional court 
functionally has the final say on the fate of a particular piece of legislation, elected 
officials must be able to trust that the court will make a decision with their best 
intentions at heart. Otherwise, elected officials will either forgo passing legislation or 
threaten the independence of courts so that they will not do anything but validate the 
constitutionality of laws. Therefore, we should only observe a constitutional court 
 51 
 
striking laws in a majoritarian manner when it shares similar preferences with elected 
officials.9 
To illustrate majoritarian judicial review as a general mechanism, it is useful to 
reference the politics of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. The bill sought to 
address rising campaign spending in elections by imposing a host of regulations on how 
national parties, corporations, and unions could raise and spend money. President Bush 
and other party leaders did not like the bill. Campaign contributions from corporations 
and other sources of soft money greatly benefitted Republicans, including Bush himself 
during his campaign for president. Indeed, the party had a history of its leaders opposing 
these reform efforts, including his father George H.W. Bush during his tenure as 
president (Gooding 2004). And if passed, the implementation of the bill would be largely 
beyond the control of elected officials. Campaign regulations are enforced by the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC), an agency designed to be insulated from political pressure. 
But vetoing the bill would have its own consequences. Promoted as a solution to 
corruption and elitism in politics, the bill became increasing popular with the public after 
a series of scandals highlighted the need for reform as well as advocacy for the measure 
during the 2000 presidential election (Gitell 2003). Furthermore, one of the bill’s 
longtime advocates was Senator John McCain. An opponent of Bush in the presidential 
primary two years before, McCain lost after a series of unusually cruel and slanderous 
attack advertisements many Republican moderates believed to be a core part of Bush’s 
                                                 
9 Not all scholars view the similarity of preferences as necessary to majoritarian judicial review; see 
Graber (1993) and Fox and Stephenson (2011). 
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campaign strategy (Gooding 2004). While vetoing the bill would garner a policy win for 
the president and other party leaders, it would have cost them in the form of public 
backlash and creating deeper divisions between party leadership and moderates.  
Rather than veto the bill or delegate to the FEC, Bush signed the bill while 
expressing his desire for the Court to judge its constitutional merits. In his signing 
statement, he praised the aims of the bill while criticizing a number of provisions. He 
particularly emphasized constitutional challenges to the bill, saying it severely restricted 
free speech and expressed his wish “that the courts will resolve these legitimate legal 
questions as appropriate under the law” (2002). By doing so, he avoided all costs 
associated with a veto. At the same time, he signaled his intention to entrust ultimate 
responsibility for the law to the judiciary.  
Initially, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of parts of the law in 
McConnell v. FEC (2003). But after a few appointments by Bush, the conservative Court 
began to dismantle the law. The Court first invalidated prohibitions on issue 
advertisements by corporations and unions in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (2007). It 
then invalidated the “millionaire’s amendment” in Davis v. FEC (2008). Finally, the 
Court invalidated the prohibition of corporate and union election spending beyond 
normal contribution limits in Citizens United v. FEC (2009), paving the way for Super 
PACs to dominate election spending. A clear example of majoritarian judicial review, it 
is important to note that Bush only signed the bill because of the political costs of 
preventing its passage and the increasingly conservative nature of the Court. Had there 
been no costs to a veto – or if the Court had been overwhelmingly liberal – Bush would 
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have likely vetoed the bill instead and the Court would not have had an opportunity to 
strike down the legislation. 
3.3. Majoritarian Judicial Review in Presidential Systems 
In most presentations of majoritarian judicial review, elected officials are treated 
as if they occupy a unitary branch of government (Salzberger 1993, Rogers 2001, Fox 
and Stephenson 2011). This occurs for a number of reasons. Scholars may desire to 
focus on legislative-judicial politics, a worthy area on study, and omit the executive for 
expository purposes (Salzberger 1993, Rogers 2001). Scholars might also create formal 
models that use a unitary elected official as a simplifying tool to make solutions more 
tractable (Rogers 2001, Fox and Stephenson 2011).  
Regardless of the reason why elected officials are treated as monoliths, this 
approach is problematic. Democratic governments that are functionally unitary actors are 
rarely subject to judicial review from a constitutional court. While the policymaking 
authority in the United Kingdom is largely dominated by the House of Commons, for 
example, subsequent legislation is not subject to judicial review because there is no 
formal constitution and its constitutional court is subservient to parliament. Rather, 
policymaking authority in most countries with independent constitutional courts is 
formally separated to different branches of government that are separately survivable. 
While the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, can 
evaluate the constitutionality of hypothetical and actual legislation, such legislation must 
be approved by both of the national legislatures of Germany, the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat, whose members are selected independently of each other. 
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One of the most common political systems with split policymaking authority are 
presidential systems. The executive and the legislature are independently selected and 
share authority to create law, a separation of powers designed to check tyranny. These 
systems can have a dominant national coalition, as the U.S. Democratic Party had 
through much of the twentieth century. But these systems can also have different 
branches controlled by different political parties. Even copartisans can face severe 
disagreements, as was the case with Jimmy Carter and Democrats in Congress during the 
1970’s.  Scholars must take into account this potential for disunity when promoting 
theories of majoritarian judicial review.  
In contrast to much of the literature, Whittington (2007) focuses on majoritarian 
judicial review from a presidential perspective rather than a legislative one. He argues 
that the president has a number of tools to incentivize courts to help promote a policy 
agenda, some of which are unique to the president; this, in turn, leads to him finding 
evidence consistent with executive-focused judicial review. But while his coverage of 
executive-judicial relations is robust, parallel coverage of legislative-judicial relations is 
largely absent. No consideration is given to unique mechanisms supporting legislative-
focused majoritarian judicial review. Likewise, there is no attempt to find evidence 
either supporting or failing to support legislative-focused judicial review. This, in turn, 
undermines his evidence of executive-focused majoritarian judicial review, as it is 
equally possible that such evidence merely supports the existence of some general form 
of majoritarian judicial review. 
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How does the separation of powers influence majoritarian judicial review in 
presidential systems? Both the executive and the legislative branches are driven by 
policy goals. Both can substantially influence policy.10 And both may prefer judicial 
action over direct action in certain circumstances, as previously described. Given the 
possibility of conflicting preferences, which branch does a constitutional court support in 
practice? To answer this question, I look at the American context to interrogate distinct 
reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court might support a particular branch. 
3.4. Congress – The Purse and Public Opinion 
As the legislature, Congress has the final say on whether potential legislation 
becomes law. Within its broad authority of “the purse”, Congress can pass legislation 
that serves either as a carrot or a stick to judicial efforts. Congress can grant pay 
increases, resources and support, and docket discretion all through ordinary legislation. 
On the flip side, Congress can limit financial resources, increase judicial workloads, and, 
outside of the legislation, even impeach justices (Rosenberg 1992). And while the 
president can veto legislation, a determined Congress can override a veto. If Congress 
can exercise these powers, a forward looking Court has substantial incentive to do 
Congress favors including striking undesirable laws for Congress 
Whether Congress can exercise these powers, however, is a different question. 
Most court-curbing legislation stalls in a committee (Clark 2009, 2010).  Those that do 
gain substantial traction and even pass are historically supported by the president 
                                                 
10 While the legislature has formal authority over policymaking, presidents have both formal and informal 
powers that can be used to influence policy as well.   
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(Whittington 2007). And while Congress can override a presidential veto, the onerous 
supermajority requirements to do so may prove impossible for most court-curbing 
efforts. While in theory Congress has a number of tools to punish the Court, in practice 
Congress may not be able to use them to garner any meaningful influence. 
More likely, court-curbing measures may be a valuable signal of public opinion 
to the Court. Popular election requires Members of Congress to know a great deal about 
public opinion; Mayhew describes them as “single-minded reelection seekers” (1974). 
Clark (2009, 2010) argues that this electoral connection leads to Congress being 
relatively more informed about public opinion that the Court. A number of studies 
indicate that the Court is sensitive to public opinion, due to its effect on legitimacy 
(Bryan and Kromphardt 2016, Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011, McGuire and 
Stimpson 2004). If Congress prefers the Court to invalidate a statute under review, the 
Court may interpret this as a signal of the public’s desires as well.  
Of course, the president is also an elected official. But presidential elections are 
less frequent than congressional ones, leading the president’s preferences to be more out 
of line than Congress’. In addition, presidents are term limited; the actions of a lame 
duck president may not reflect public opinion because the president will not be up for 
reelection. In contrast, Members of Congress are not term limited and face consistent 
pressures to follow public opinion. Thus while presidential actions may also signal 
public opinion, that signal is almost certainly weaker. 
None of the preceding discussion is to suggest that Congress is itself a unitary 
actor. Congress is a bicameral institution with independently elected houses that can also 
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have competing preferences. It is possible that each house could also have distinct 
influence of majoritarian judicial review, a fact not lost on scholars. Harvey (2013) 
argues that the Court should be sensitive to the preferences of the House of 
Representatives rather than the Senate. Because the House controls the beginning of the 
appropriations and impeachment process, it has more control over the tools used to 
influence judicial decision-making. The entire membership of the House is also up for 
reelection every two years, while the Senate is fully replaced over a six year cycle; this 
greater frequency of election likely makes House action more representative of public 
opinion (Clark 2010). Thus any account that distinguishes between the president and 
congressional influence, at minimum, consider the differences in the influence of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. 
There are notable examples of legislative-focused majoritarian judicial review. 
Congress has historically deferred to the courts on the divisive issues of slavery, antitrust 
law, and abortion in order to avoid political infighting that could damage majority 
coalitions (Graber 1993). Congress also relied on the Court to sort out the complex and 
competing property rights claims during the settlement of the Louisiana Purchase in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century rather than reconcile complex and contradictory 
federal statutes on the matter (Whittington 2007). And Congress engaged in blatant 
political posturing when passing the Flag Protection Act by a near unanimous margin in 
the late 1980’s; the statute, which contradicted the case Texas v. Johnson (1989) that was 
decided just a few months prior to passage, was subsequently invalidated (Whittington 
2007). While these examples are certainly illustrative of majoritarian judicial review, it 
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is unclear whether they are part of a systematic effort by the Court to invalidate statutes 
to aid Congress or simply idiosyncratic outliers.11 
3.5. The President – Executive without Equal 
 One of the primary advantages of the executive branch is its hierarchical nature. 
The president controls almost every aspect of the executive branch and its powers, both 
formal and informal. And because of this unified control, the Court can easily 
understand the preferences of the president concerning legislation that the Court.  
Presidents have regularly vetoed legislation since the founding on constitutional 
grounds, usually with written or oral statements saying as much. Expanding beyond 
vetoes, presidents have increasingly issued signing statements to indicate constitutional 
concerns with a statute that is nonetheless enacted into law.  As Whittington argues, 
these statements “are generally offered for later judicial consumption, in the hopes that 
the courts will either use the presidential statement as part of the legislative history of the 
statute that might guide its interpretation or take its signal to review the legislation and 
authoritatively settle any constitutional issues raised” (2007).  
Of course, such messages are not exclusive to the president; Members of 
Congress can also publicly voice constitutional concerns with pieces of legislation. But 
such voices can be drowned by proponents of legislation supporting its constitutional 
grounds or suffocated by the indifference of their peers. While some Members of 
                                                 
11 The exception is Lindquist and Corley (2012), which shows that the U.S. Supreme Court strikes state 
laws more often when Congress opposes those laws. This is consistent with the Court enforcing the will of 
national coalitions on the states. 
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Congress are certainly more influential than others – such as the Speaker of the House 
and the Senate Majority leader – their objection to a bill might not be shared by their 
colleagues and thus either ignored by the Justices or not expressed whatsoever. And 
even if an important plurality of Members share the same views, it still may not be 
enough to overcome congressional inertia. Compared to his peers in Congress, the 
president may be in a unique position to prime the Court to exercise judicial review on 
its behalf. 
Beyond the ability to express views on legislation, the president also has ample 
capacity to persuade the Court using traditional legal means. The president controls the 
Solicitor General’s office, described by many as “the finest law firm in the nation” 
(Black and Owens 2012). Using its unmatched resources and expertise, the Solicitor 
General is highly effective at convincing the Court to support the president’s position 
when a party in a case. The president may refuse to defend a law, such as Obama did 
when the Defense of Marriage Act was challenged, which undermines the chances of 
that law surviving. Even when not directly a party, the Solicitor General’s office 
regularly influence outcomes by filing amicus briefs. And the president can use the 
Department of Justice’s resources to support litigation when it does not take an official 
stance on a case, as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Civil Rights Section of the Department of 
Justice did when supporting the NAACP’s efforts in Smith v. Allwright (1944) 
(McMahon 2004). Congress has no clear analogue to the Department of Justice and, as a 
result, is gravely behind in their ability to persuade the Court using legal means. 
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The president also nominates individuals to become justices when there are open 
Court seats. While the Senate must confirm nominees to the Court, the president’s power 
of nomination grants the president large control over who does and does not become a 
justice. This power allows the president to appoint justices that are ideologically similar, 
making majoritarian judicial review more likely. Sitting justices may also feel loyalty to 
the president who nominated them, privileging their views over other elected officials 
and even sound legal doctrine. Epstein and Posner (2016) find that justices of both 
parties are more loyal to appointing presidents than their successors, which they attribute 
to the gratitude the justices feel for being nominated to the bench. This psychological 
attachment, even if only relevant for a single justice in a given case, may be enough for 
the Court to ultimately strike a law not favored by the president. 
The executive branch also implements statutes and Court decisions (Whittington 
2007). This responsibility can be shirked when implementation runs counter to the 
president’s goals. In particular, a president’s refusal to implement a statute on 
constitutional grounds has spurred a significant legal scholarship debating the subject 
(see Burgess 1993, Johnsen 2000, Prakash 2008). The refusal to implement a law may 
remove any policy incentive the Court has to uphold a law the president opposes; if there 
are legal and political incentives to strike a law, those incentives may now be decisive in 
judicial decision-making. Similarly, the Court may not decide a case according to its 
sincere preferences, legal or ideological, if the president is unlikely to implement them. 
Hall (2014) shows that when implementation of a decision falls outside of the judiciary, 
the Court more strongly values the preferences of elected officials and the public. 
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Of course, Congress can also interfere with the Court’s incentives by refusing to 
implement decisions. Congress has routinely passed veto-proof legislation designed to 
contradict Supreme Court decisions, as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
did to Employment Division v. Smith (1990). Congress also regularly ignores previous 
Court rulings when drafting new legislation. When the Court invalidated the one-house 
legislative veto in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983), Congress 
did not seem to notice. It refused to amend existing laws including such a provision and 
continued to pass new laws containing them (Epstein and Knight 1998). Thus while the 
president has power to influence the Court via nonimplementation, that power is far 
from unique. 
Whittington (2007) provides a number of examples for executive-focused 
judicial review as he argues that the Court caters to presidential preferences. Democratic 
Presidents Truman and Kennedy avoided an intraparty split on civil rights issues by 
deferring to Court rulings on these issues. President Cleveland relied on judicial review 
to undo policy compromises on the income tax; President Clinton did the same on 
obscenity laws. And presidents have historically looked to the Court to buttress 
executive authority over defense and foreign policy during times of divided government. 
But while Whittington supports his argument with case studies, there has yet to be a 
systematic demonstration of majoritarian judicial review on behalf of the president or an 
absence of majoritarian judicial review on behalf of Congress. 
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3.6. Research Design 
There are two distinct interpretations of majoritarian judicial review in 
presidential systems. One interpretation would focus the relationship between the 
judiciary and the legislature, while the other would focus on the relationship between the 
judiciary and the executive. These interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive; 
a constitutional court can attempt to advance the policy goals of both branches, although 
it cannot do both in every case. But the motivations for assisting either branch of 
government are largely unique and inspire separate hypotheses about judicial behavior, 
especially since these branches of government can have conflicted policy preferences. 
Thus, there are two distinct hypotheses to consider: 
Legislative-Focused Majoritarian Judicial Review: There is a positive relationship 
between a constitutional court’s probability of striking a statute and political 
circumstances in which the legislature prefers judicial review over direct policy action 
when the two branches have similar policy preferences. This relationship should decline 
as the distance between the preferences of the court and the legislature increase. 
Executive-Focused Majoritarian Judicial Review: There is a positive relationship 
between a constitutional court’s probability of striking a statute and political 
circumstances in which the executive prefers judicial review over direct policy action 
when the two branches have similar policy preferences. This relationship should decline 
as the distance between the preferences of the court and the executive increase. 
 As a conditional hypothesis, the most straightforward test would be to use 
multiplicative interactions and plot the conditional marginal effects (Brambor, Clark, 
 63 
 
and Golder 2006). An example of a marginal effect plot that supports these hypotheses is 
presented in Figure 1. When the Court and elected officials have identical preferences – 
or when the distance between their preferences is minimized at zero – political 
circumstances that favor majoritarian judicial review increase the probability that a law 
is invalidated. But as preferences becoming increasing dissimilar – or the distance 
between the two grows – the marginal effect declines until it becomes statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  
 
Figure 3-1: Example of Marginal Effect Plot Supportive of Hypotheses 
 
 
 
In order to test these two hypotheses, I need to analyze a set of constitutional 
court decisions in a presidential system with measures of both the distance between the 
court’s ideological preferences and those of elected officials as well as measures of 
political contexts in which elected officials may rely upon majoritarian judicial review. 
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U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which are made in the context of a presidential system of 
government, are ideal for at least two reasons. First, significant scholarly attention has 
been given to the ideal point measures of Supreme Court justices, Members of Congress, 
and the president in the same ideological space (Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland 
2007, Bailey 2007). Second, all of the majoritarian theories described were written with 
the Supreme Court in mind, as all of the qualitative evidence supporting these claims 
comes from it; it thus provides the natural test case. For these reason, I analyze a subset 
of U.S. Supreme Court decisions from 1951-2011. 
Rather than solely focusing on U.S. Supreme Court decisions, however, this 
analysis draws on a statute-centered approach of previous studies (Hall and Ura 2015, 
Harvey and Friedman 2006, 2009). The study of judicial review inevitably leads to 
studying court decisions. Solely studying them in presence of a discretionary docket, 
however, can lead to a selection bias as strategic interactions may happen at the 
certiorari stage. This can negatively impact our ability to make inferences, meaning we 
must go beyond simply looking at decisions and look at the statutes which the decisions 
are about. Thus, the unit of observation in this analysis are federal statutes. Of course, 
there are difficulties with looking at all federal statutes. Collection of the data is 
prohibitively costly and would thus limit analysis to a small time period. As a middle 
ground, I analyze a subset of statutes enacted between 1951 and 2011. The subset is 
whether a law is landmark legislation, as defined by Mayhew’s “Sweep 1” process 
(2005). This results in 358 important laws, with writs granted 141 times and 
invalidations by the Court 50 times.  
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In order to account for potential selection effects in the merits stage, as well as 
examine interesting relationships at the certiorari stage, the model used in this analysis is 
a Heckman probit model. The first stage is a model of the Court’s decision to hear a 
challenge of an important statute in a given year. The second stage is a model of the 
Court’s decision to invalidate, in part or in whole, the statute on constitutional grounds. 
This model allows us to control for potential sample selection bias at the merits stage, 
though it does not allow for us to disentangle what social processes are governing 
whether a statute is granted a constitutional challenge.12 It also allows for a robustness 
check of findings at the decision stage: if the Court is more likely to invalidate laws in a 
majoritarian manner in certain political circumstances, it should also be more likely to 
hear challenges to those laws in the same set of circumstances. In order to both help with 
model convergence and control for duration dependence, I include cubic polynomials of 
years without a challenge in the first stage. 
In order to test my hypotheses, I construct four measures that capture the 
circumstances in which elected officials might desire majoritarian judicial review. 
Elected officials do not always take positions on cases before the Court, such as 
explicitly advocating for federal statutes to be upheld or invalidated using judicial 
review. Even when they do, such positions might be a result of position-taking rather 
than a reflection of sincere policy preferences (Fox and Stephenson 2011). Instead of 
directly measuring whether elected officials announce their desire for the Court to strike 
                                                 
12 The certiorari process is influenced by a number of actors, including litigants, lower court judges, 
political elites, and the justices themselves. 
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a statute, I instead measure circumstances in which one would expect elected officials to 
desire majoritarian judicial review. If the Court does engage in majoritarian judicial 
review, it should be more likely to strike laws in these circumstances when it shares 
policy preferences with another branch of government. The four measures I construct 
reflect the four mechanisms of majoritarian judicial review described earlier in the paper. 
Rogers’ (2001) model of informative judicial review posits that a legislature will 
defer to an ideologically similar court when an issue is of sufficient complexity. To code 
complexity, I adapt Vanberg’s (2001) complexity measure to this analysis. It is a binary 
measure with any statute whose subject matter dealt with economic regulation, state-
mandated social insurance, civil servant compensation, taxation, federal budget issues, 
or campaign finance is coded as hard and given a 0. All others are coded as easy and 
given a 1. While Vanberg originally meant for the measure to represent an issue that 
may have less political transparency, he agrees that these issues “tend to involve 
technical regulatory questions.” These questions are the ones that policymakers may not 
understand the full impact a statute has when passing it, precisely the types of issues 
Rogers describes in his theory. 
Graber (1993) argues that politically divisive issues should be ones that the 
president and Congress defer to Court to resolve the issue. This theory can be tested 
simultaneously with a measure of the divisiveness of a party on an issue. This is 
calculated using the votes in the House of Representatives on the statute under review. 
First I calculated the proportion of individuals in a party who voted for the particular 
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statute.13 For legislative-focused majoritarian judicial review, this is the majority party in 
the House; for executive-focused judicial review, it is the president’s party. For all voice 
votes, the value is coded as 1. In order to remove the distinction between unanimous 
support and unanimous opposition to a bill, I folded this measure. To do this, I 
subtracted 0.5 from this measure, so that the range was -0.5 to 0.5, and then took the 
absolute value of the result. Finally, I multiply the resulting number by 2 and subtract 
this value from 1. The new range of the measure is from 0 to 1, where a value of 1 
indicates a perfect split in the party’s vote on a statute and a value of 0 unanimity.14 
Equation 1: 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =  1 − 2 ∗ |
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑠
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠
 –  0.5| 
Whittington (2007) also argues that when entrenched interests in the status quo 
prevent the passage of new legislation, elected officials may look to the Court to strike 
less desirable laws. The American system is notably marked by separation of powers, 
but there is variation in whether those powers are unified under a single political party. 
To account for a governing party’s inability to pass a law, I include a dummy measure of 
in which a 1 indicates the partisan composition of the U.S. Congress and the president is 
divided and a 0 indicates unified. 
Fox and Stephenson (2011) argue that majoritarian judicial review creates a 
moral hazard, where politicians pass constitutionally questionable laws to pander to the 
public with the expectation that the Court will strike the law down if necessary. There is 
                                                 
13 Data was gathered from Mayhew’s (2005) original data files and updates for his book and supplemented 
with information from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 
14 Again, I calculate this for both the president’s party and the majority party to accommodate for 
differences in opinion regarding whose preferences should matter. 
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not a currently defined measure of the constitutional soundness of a statute, at least one 
that can be scaled up quickly. The real world examples used for this theoretical story, 
however, always feature bills passed by a unanimous or near-unanimous legislature. 
Thus, I operationalize statutes as pandering to the public as a dummy variable, where a 1 
indicates that a statute had 90% or greater support in both houses of Congress and signed 
by the president and 0 otherwise. 
I also must construct a measure of the ideological similarity between the U.S. 
Supreme Court and elected officials. To do so, I employ Bailey’s (2013) ideal point 
estimates and construct a measure of the absolute distance between the median justice on 
the Supreme Court’s ideal point and the ideal point of the respective branch of 
government. This construction reflects the choice that elected officials have to make 
between direct policy action and relying on the Court to influence policy. For the 
executive branch, I simply use the president’s ideal point. For the legislative branch, I 
use the average of the House median and the Senate median to reflect the institution’s 
bicameral nature. In the replication materials, I also divide Congress into the House 
median and Senate median and rerun the analysis. The results are largely the same but 
are not shown because they are more complex than the ones contained here. 
There is some debate about which elected officials’ ideal points I should use: the 
officials in office at the time of a statute’s passage or the officials in office at the time of 
the Court’s decision. This decision is made on a case-by-case basis depending on the 
exact majoritarian mechanism tested. Uncertain policy environments make it difficult to 
forecast the future impact of legislation. For this mechanism, then, I use elected officials 
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at the time of passage. Similarly, the moral hazard to pass unconstitutional legislation in 
order to pander to voters is necessarily a conflict for those creating such legislation; I 
also use elected officials at the time of passage for this mechanism.15 In contrast, divided 
government makes it difficult to fight entrenched interests on existing legislation. For 
this mechanism, I use elected officials at the time of the Court’s decision. Finally, 
divisiveness within a party can reasonably affect both elected officials attempts at 
passing new legislation and repealing existing ones; both sets of ideal points seem 
plausible. I present the results for current elected officials in this manuscript while also 
mentioning the results for elected officials at the time of legislature passage, which can 
be found in the supplementary materials. 
To test my hypotheses, I estimate four models using the four different 
mechanisms of majoritarian judicial review and jointly examining the effect of 
presidential and congressional preferences. More specifically, I create a multiplicative 
interaction of one of the majoritarian mechanisms and both the ideological distance 
between the Court and the president and the ideological distance between the Court and 
Congress. If the hypotheses are correct, we should expect a few outcomes. First, the 
constitutive term of the majoritarian mechanism should be positive and statistically 
significant. As a multiplicative interaction, this constitutive term can be roughly 
interpreted as the effect that these majoritarian mechanisms have when the Court and 
                                                 
15 When using the ideal points of the enacting officials in a model, I exclude those statutes subject to a 
presidential veto and subsequent override. Such cases cannot be examples of majoritarian judicial review, 
as the president is taking direct action rather than relying on the Court to achieve a policy outcome.  
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elected officials have identical policy preferences (or the distance between them is zero) 
(Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). A positive effect reflects the first part of both 
hypotheses. Second, the constitutive term of the distance between the Court and elected 
officials should be positive and statistically significant. This term can be interpreted as 
the effect of ideological distance when there is no reason for the Court to strike down a 
law for elected officials. Finally, the interaction terms should be negative and 
statistically significant. As the ideological distance grows between the Court and elected 
officials, the effect of these majoritarian mechanisms should decline until it is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
In addition to my variables of interest, I also control for competing explanations 
of judicial review with a number of control variables. To control for the attitudinal 
model of U.S. Supreme Court decision-making (Segal and Spaeth 2002), I use a 
combination of Bailey’s (2013) ideal point estimates of justices’ ideology and the 
direction of the decision classification from the Supreme Court Database. If striking a 
statute was consistent with the median member of the court’s ideological predisposition, 
then the observation is assigned the absolute value of the median member’s ideal point. 
If not, then the observation is assigned the negative of the absolute value of the median 
member’s ideal point. All cases where the ideological implications of a decision were 
unclear were coded as zero. This results in a measure of the court’s attitudes towards the 
case where positive values indicate the court is ideologically inclined to striking and 
negative values indicate the court is ideologically opposed to striking. 
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The complexity of an issue area is also correlated with the salience of the issue 
area; less complex issues tend to be more salient ones (Vanberg 2001). This creates a 
complication in our models, as a particularly salient case is likely to result in the Court 
being protected from court-curbing and thus more likely to strike down a statute as 
unconstitutional. In order to control for the effect of salience, I include a measure of case 
salience created by Epstein and Segal’s (2000) measure of case salience. It is a binary 
measure where a 1 indicates that the decision was reported on the front page of the New 
York Times and 0 otherwise; a 1 is an indicator of case saliency. 
3.7. Analysis 
The results of my analysis are contained in Table 1. I begin by focusing on 
legislative-focused judicial review. As one can see, the variables of interest are only 
sometimes correctly signed and almost never statistically significant in either stage of 
the model. At the invalidation stage, the only exception is in the model of pandering 
where the constitutive term on ideological distance is positive and statistically 
significant. Increasing ideological distance between the Court and Congress on more 
contentious statutes results in an increased probability of the Court striking down the 
statute. At the certiorari stage, the exception is divided government where the interaction 
term is statistically significant. Increasing ideological distance between the Court and 
Congress during times of divided government results in a decreased probability of the 
Court granting certiorari to a constitutional challenge. This absence of results is largely 
true at the challenge stage of the model.  
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Table 3-1: Heckman Probit Model of Legislative-Focused and Executive-Focused 
Majoritarian Judicial Review 
Stage 2: Invalidations of 
important federal statutes 
Complexity Statute 
Divisiveness 
Divided 
Government 
Pandering 
     Majoritarian Mechanism - 
     Congress+ 
0.80 
(0.81) 
0.18 
(0.61) 
-0.22 
(0.71) 
-2.39 
(0.75) 
     Distance to Congress -0.29 
(0.91) 
0.48 
(0.70) 
0.69 
(0.62) 
0.54* 
(0.32) 
     Majoritarian Mechanism* 
     Distance to Congress 
1.59 
(1.10) 
-0.60 
(1.28) 
-0.06 
(0.80) 
3.09 
(1.28) 
     Majoritarian Mechanism - 
     President 
- 1.11 
(1.20) 
- - 
     Distance to President 1.40** 
(0.55) 
0.98 
(0.63) 
-0.07 
(0.48) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
     Majoritarian Mechanism* 
     Distance to President 
-0.99 
(0.65) 
-2.02 
(1.52) 
0.85 
(0.75) 
2.21 
(0.67) 
     Court Ideology 0.08 
(0.30) 
0.43* 
(0.24) 
0.51* 
(0.22) 
0.49* 
(0.22) 
     Salience 0.71** 
(0.23) 
- - - 
     Constant -0.47 
(1.13) 
0.38 
(0.99) 
0.71 
(0.78) 
1.06 
(0.72) 
Stage 1: Challenges to 
important federal statutes 
    
     Majoritarian Mechanism - 
     Congress+ 
0.32 
(0.24) 
0.21 
(0.21) 
-0.07 
(0.23) 
0.23 
(0.25) 
     Distance to Congress -0.32 
(0.19) 
-0.42 
(0.21) 
-0.16 
(0.20) 
-0.27 
(0.25) 
     Majoritarian Mechanism* 
     Distance to Congress 
0.02 
(0.37) 
0.15 
(0.41) 
-0.35* 
(0.28) 
-0.27 
(0.33) 
     Majoritarian Mechanism - 
     President 
- 0.84** 
(0.30) 
- - 
     Distance to President 0.02 
(0.15) 
0.32** 
(0.13) 
-0.14 
(0.18) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
     Majoritarian Mechanism* 
     Distance to President 
-0.25 
(0.18) 
-0.94** 
(0.27) 
0.35 
(0.22) 
-0.40 
(0.26) 
     Years without challenge -0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
     Years without challenge 2 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
     Years without challenge 3 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
     Constant -1.73** 
(0.18) 
-1.93** 
(0.16) 
-1.61** 
(0.22) 
-1.60 
(0.14) 
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Model Features Complexity Statute 
Divisiveness 
Divided 
Government 
Pandering 
LR Test of Independent 
Equations 
3.73 3.63 3.74 3.31 
N Stage 1 10680 10998 10998 10680 
N Stage 2 128 141 141 128 
*p<.05, **p<.01, one-tailed tests where applicable 
+ In most models, the majoritarian mechanism for both branches will be the same 
variable. 
Standard errors clustered by statute 
 
 
To aid in the interpretation of the multiplicative interactions, I calculate the 
average marginal effect in the sample of each majoritarian mechanism in the invalidation 
stage across the empirical range of the ideological distance between the Court and 
elected officials. The legislative-focused results are in Figure 2. In order to be consistent 
with legislative-focused majoritarian judicial review, the marginal effect should be 
positive and statistically significant when the ideological distance between the Court and 
Congress is at zero and decline as the distance grows. This pattern is largely absent from 
the figure.  
The sole exception, however, is for divided government. When Congress and the 
Court have identical preferences, a transition to divided government increases the 
probability the Court will strike a statute by 20%. This effect quickly declines and 
becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. Combined with the results from the 
certiorari stage, this provides some evidence that the Court exercises majoritarian 
judicial review on behalf of Congress. For the other mechanisms, however, I fail to find 
evidence supporting legislative-focused judicial review. 
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Figure 3-2: Average Marginal Effect of Mechanisms of Majoritarian Judicial 
Review on the Probability of the Court Invalidating a Statute by the Ideological 
Distance between the Court and Congress. 
 
 
 
Turning now to executive-focused judicial review, there are statistically 
significant results in the first two models. In the complexity model, the ideological 
distance constitutive term is positive in both stages and statistically significant in the 
second stage; the Court is more likely to hear a strike a noncomplex statute relative to a 
complex one when the Court and the president have diverging preferences. Additionally, 
the interaction term is negative in both stages, though just missing statistical 
significance. This indicates that as the ideological distance grows between the Court and 
the president, the Court becomes less likely to grant a challenge to and subsequently 
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strike complex laws. These results provide tepid support for the executive-focused 
majoritarian judicial review hypothesis. 
The statute divisiveness model has stronger results. In each stage, the 
divisiveness constitutive terms are positive and the interaction term is negative. In the 
challenge stage, these terms are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In the 
invalidation stage, the interaction term narrowly misses statistical significance and the 
ideological distance constitutive term is statistically significant. These results increase 
the cumulative support for executive-focused judicial review. 
The other two models do not show support for theory. The coefficients are 
occasionally correctly signed, but are never statistically significant when correctly 
signed. Perhaps there are additional considerations for the effect of divided government 
and pandering on executive-focused judicial review that are not be accounted for with 
these models. Future research will have to go into these possibilities. 
The average marginal effects in the sample of each majoritarian mechanism 
across the empirical range of the ideological distance between the president and the 
Court are contained in Figure 3. Here we see strong evidence for the complexity and 
statute divisiveness models. When the Court and the president have identical ideology, 
the Court is 40% more likely to invalidate a complex statute than a noncomplex one. 
Similarly, the Court is 50% more likely to invalidate a statute that perfectly splits the 
president’s party relative to one that has unanimous support. In both models, this 
marginal effect declines until it is statistically insignificant and, in the case of 
divisiveness, a significant negative effect. Again, we do not see support in the divided 
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government and pandering models but instead strong support in the opposite direction. I 
find support for executive-focused judicial review in two of the models. 
 
Figure 3-3: Average Marginal Effect of Mechanisms of Majoritarian Judicial 
Review on the Probability of the Court Invalidating a Statute by the Ideological 
Distance between the Court and the president. 
 
 
 
Beyond the variables of interest, the models controls perform largely as expected. 
The coefficients of the Court’s and the public’s ideological disposition in the case are 
mostly positive and statistically significant. As the Court (or the public) become more 
ideologically inclined to strike a law, the probability that the Court strikes a law under 
review increases. Additionally, the cubic polynomials are jointly statistically significant 
and the first term is independently statistically significant in all of the models. After a 
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law is passed or previously challenged, a subsequent challenge is most likely in years 
immediately afterward and quickly declines to zero.  
Prior to concluding, I note here the results concerning sample selection bias. 
None of the models have a Wald test of independent equations that is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. All of the tests, however, are all significant at the 0.1 
level with an average p-value under 0.06. I am not willing to discard such consistent 
evidence on the basis of a single percentage point. This constitutes strong evidence of 
sample selection bias, a phenomena scholars have long feared to be the case but never 
directly reported (Harvey and Friedman 2006, 2009, Hall and Ura 2015). These results 
provide a warning against studies of judicial decision-making that do not take into 
account decision-making at the certiorari stage as well as the merits stage.  
3.8. Discussion 
This study examines majoritarian judicial review in presidential systems, 
comparing and contrasting the incentives constitutional courts have to exercise judicial 
review to advance the policy goals of legislatures and presidents. I then test distinct 
predictions about majoritarian judicial review by analyzing U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions during the post-War period. I find evidence for both executive-focused and 
legislative-focused judicial review, though the stronger evidence is certainly for the 
presidency. The Court invalidates laws for the president in complex policy areas, where 
the Court might have greater expertise, and on issues divisive in the president’s party, 
where the president taking a stance could unravel the president’s legislative coalition. 
 78 
 
The Court also invalidates laws for Congress during times of divided government, when 
pursuing legislative change might be impossible.  
This study is not without limitations. There is concern about the generalizability 
of the findings. The research design focuses on statutes that are regarded as salient at the 
time of passage. Many are also considered landmark statutes in retrospective review. But 
the focus on important statutes excludes statutes with low political salience. In these 
cases, it is entirely possible that the results would differ. Whittington (2007) argues that 
elected officials are more likely to support majoritarian judicial review in cases with low 
political salience. If true, then we would expect to find stronger evidence of majoritarian 
judicial review in statutes with low political salience. Conversely, the results presented 
here represent a conservative test of majoritarian judicial review, making the evidence 
all the more compelling. 
Additionally, the analysis focuses exclusively on U.S. Supreme Court data. 
While this is done because existing research on majoritarian judicial review focuses on 
the Court, these theories may well describe judicial decision-making on subnational and 
international courts. Additionally, this paper suggests that majoritarian judicial review 
functions differently in presidential and parliamentary systems. Future research should 
investigate these theories function in other political contexts. 
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4. SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE AND THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The most important principle for constitutional courts exercising judicial review 
is deference to the legislature. While constitutional courts are vested with the authority 
to invalidate statutes by declaring them unconstitutional, they are not vested with the 
authority to create law. Thus judges should be careful not to let the desirability of a law 
from a policy perspective contaminate the legitimacy of a law from a constitutional 
perspective (Bickel 1962). Such a view has been around since the emergence of modern 
democracy; Thomas Jefferson once expressed that “one single object [earns] the endless 
gratitude of society; that of restraining judges from usurping legislation. And with no 
body of men is this restraint more wanting than with the judges of what is commonly 
called our general government”. In the American context, this principle has manifested 
itself in the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to strike down federal laws when given the 
opportunity (Dahl 1957, Bailey and Maltzman 2011).  
Yet there are times when even the most principled judge must strike a law as 
unconstitutional. In these instances, judicial restraint is still at the forefront of judicial 
decisionmaking. Perhaps the most prominent example of this is decisions regarding 
severability. If an unconstitutional statutory provision of a statute is severable, a court 
may “sever” that provision from the statute so that the remainder still carries the full 
force of law. Judges sever unconstitutional provisions as a means of deferring to the 
legislature by preserving as much of the original statute as possible.  If a statutory 
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provision is inseverable, however, the court will strike down not only the 
unconstitutional provision but also interrelated, otherwise constitutional provisions of 
that same statute. 
Severability can be highly salient in Court decisions and, as a result, highly 
influential in policy outcomes. The constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, the 
landmark piece of healthcare legislation from the Obama administration, was challenged 
in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012). The most pressing 
question of the case was whether the statute’s individual mandate, which required 
virtually all persons in the U.S. to purchase health insurance, was under Congress’ 
authority in Article I of the Constitution. Almost equally important was whether other 
provisions of the law would be invalidated as inseverable if the mandate were found 
unconstitutional. All parties of the case filed separate briefs on the issue of severability, 
and several amicus briefs on the matter were also filed. The Court eventually found the 
individual mandate to be constitutional exercise of taxing powers. New litigation on the 
mandate triggered by reforms during the Trump administration, however, once again 
highlight severability concerns; a judge from the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Texas recently ruled the entirety of the statute unconstitutional because it was 
inseverable from the mandate (Texas et. al. v. U.S. et al. 2018).  
Severability doctrine is widely discussed within legal scholarship. There is large 
debate, however, about whether constitutional courts, and more specifically the U.S. 
Supreme Court, consistently approach the doctrine of severability. At best, inconsistent 
application of severability doctrine would be an unforced error on an institution known 
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for principled decisionmaking. At worst, severability may function as a mask for judicial 
activism driven by ideological motives. But while there is strong concern about the 
Court’s application of severability doctrine, there has yet to be positive analysis on the 
subject; this makes it ripe for study by empirically-oriented scholars. 
This paper analyzes the systematic determinants of severability decisions in 
constitutional law. I begin by examining the history and legal scholarship on severability 
doctrine. I next develop a series of hypotheses about the determinants of severability 
grounded in both positive and legal theory. I then test these hypotheses on U.S. Supreme 
Court constitutional decisions on important federal statutes from 1949-2011. The 
analysis reveals that while ideological considerations do drive the use of severability 
doctrine, the Court shows deference to currently serving elected officials as well. 
4.2. The Jurisprudence of Severability 
Once the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that a government action is 
unconstitutional, it must make a series of decisions in order to properly remedy the 
unconstitutional action. In general, the Court will rule as narrowly as possible as a means 
of deference to avoid needlessly frustrating legislative will. They can do this using one 
of two means (Sherwin 2000). First, the Court might decide that a statute is only 
unconstitutional as applied to a particular case (Lindquist and Corley 2011). If it does so, 
the statute still carries the full force of law except for the specific circumstances that led 
to the litigation. For example, Title III of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 set 
the voting age in national, state, and local elections to 18, an act which contradicted 
many age requirements set by state law. In Oregon v. Mitchell (1970), the Supreme 
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Court ruled that while Congress had the authority to set requirements for national 
elections, it could not set voting age requirements for state and local elections. Thus the 
Court ruled that Title III was unconstitutional as applied to state and local elections, but 
allowed the law to continue to be applied to national elections.  
Sometimes, however, certain portions of statutes have no constitutional 
applications; these are called facially unconstitutional. In the event of facially 
unconstitutional statutory provision, the Court can use its second means of deferring to 
Congress by ruling that the provision is severable (Metzger 2004). If the offending 
section is severable, also at times referred to as separable, then the unconstitutional 
portion no longer carries the full force of the law while the rest of the statute does. In 
Marbury v. Madison, the Court ruled that Congress could not change the Court’s 
jurisdiction through ordinary legislation. They ruled that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act 
of 1802 was unconstitutional, but severable; the remaining parts could still function as 
law. Indeed, the dominant paradigm for the first century of judicial review was that any 
provision of a facially unconstitutional law were severable (Nagle 1993). As a parallel in 
modern times, the majority in National Federation ruled that while the Affordable Care 
Act’s expansion of Medicaid was unconstitutional, as it violated the principle of 
federalism by attempting to coerce action by the states, this provision was severable 
from the rest of the statute and could function independently as law. 
If an offending section is facially invalid but not severable from other provisions 
of the staute, up to and including the entirety of the staute, then all of those provisions 
are ruled unconstitutional; this includes those parts of the law that, in absence of the 
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offending section, would otherwise be constitutional. The first instance of inseverability 
was Warren v. Mayor & Aldermen of Charlestown, when the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts invalidated a statute authorizing the annexation of Charlestown to Boston. 
When the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the annexation was unconstitutional, 
all subsequent provisions of the law detailing the implications of the annexation were 
also ruled unconstitutional. 
Why might a court choose to strike the entirety of a statute due to a single section 
being unconstitutional? Surprisingly, striking a law as inseverable is also justified from a 
perspective of judicial deference. If a legislature would pass a statute even without a 
constitutionally problematic provision, the Court should rule it as severable. If not, 
however, the Court should rule it as inseverable. Chief Justice Shaw, who issued the 
Warren decision, explained his decision from a viewpoint of judicial deference: 
“that the parts, so held respectively constitutional and unconstitutional, 
must be wholly independent of each other. But if they are so mutually 
connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions, 
considerations or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that 
the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not be 
carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue 
independently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions 
which are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fall with them.” 
This deference to legislative intent was subsequently adopted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court when it first confronted issues of severability in Champlin Refining 
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Company v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma (1932); the Court generally assumes 
severability “[u]nless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those 
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not”. This 
approach has changed little in subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence. In United States 
v. Booker, the Court invalidated a provision of Sentencing Reform Act that created an 
appellate review process for mandatory prison sentences because it ruled that those 
sentences themselves were unconstitutional. 
4.3. Critical Views of Severability Doctrine 
While grounded in the basis of judicial deference, the Court’s approach to 
severability is controversial amongst legal academics. From a normative angle, some 
scholars do not accept severability as judicial deference to the legislature. Noah (1999) 
views severance as a form of judicial policymaking, comparing the severing of a statute 
to the line-item veto that the Court ruled as an unconstitutional encroachment of 
legislative authority in Clinton v. City of New York (1998). The only consistent way for 
the Court to approach unconstitutional legislation is to presume inseverability in 
legislation unless explicitly stated; as will be discussed below, such an approach is not 
currently used. 
Empirically, scholars have questioned whether the Court consistently applies 
severability doctrine. Some scholars have criticized the application of severability in 
different areas of law. Stern (1937) noted that the Court might presume severability 
more often for state laws and national criminal laws. Jona (2008) argues that 
inseverability might be more common in First Amendment and Equal Protection cases. 
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Such an approach is certainly possible, given the increasing evidence that legal 
considerations play a large role in some, but not all, cases before the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Bailey and Maltzman 2011). But the most common view is that there does not appear 
any systematic application of severability doctrine (Stern 1937, Nagle 1993, Movsesian 
1995, Metzger 2004, Gans 2008). Indeed, many of these scholars suggest that 
severability is just a means by which the justices might pursue other ends, whether 
jurisprudential, ideological, or otherwise. This viewpoint is consistent with the 
attitudinal model, which posits that ideological considerations alone drive U.S. Supreme 
Court decision-making (Spaeth and Segal 2002). 
The specter that severability doctrine might not be systematically used by the 
Court should be of great interest to both legal scholars and political scientists. That 
severability doctrine might further be driven by simple ideological considerations would 
also be of great interest. But rather than simply testing predictions from legal 
scholarship, it is worth applying positive models of political institutions to see if they 
can give a systematic explanation to the Court’s use of severability doctrine. I now turn 
to the legislative and judicial politics literatures to derive relevant testable hypotheses. 
4.4. Severability Doctrine and Severability Clauses 
Within the separation of powers, judicial review is the strongest tool the U.S. 
Supreme Court has to influence public policy. Such a strong power naturally draws the 
attention of the U.S. Congress, who does not want judicial review exercised arbitrarily. 
Indeed, Congress has many tools at its disposal to respond to Court decisions and 
coordinately construct the Constitution, including both blunting the effect of decisions 
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via statute (Ignagni and Meernik 1994, Meernik and Ignagni 1997) and punishing the 
Court for making an unpopular decision (Whittington 2007, Ura and Wohlfath 2010, 
Harvey 2013). Beyond changing the status quo, there is plenty of evidence that shows 
that the threat of such tools influences judicial decision-making (Clark 2009, McGuire 
2004). 
But Congress does not only rely on ex post retaliation when confronted with the 
possibility of judicial review. Legislators can anticipate judicial review when crafting 
legislation, adding in provisions that guide the decision-making of the courts when 
reviewing the constitutionality of a statute. One of the most prominent provisions added 
to statutes are severability clauses (Nagle 1993). Utilized soon after American courts 
began employing severability doctrine, these clauses specifically state that certain or all 
provisions within a statute are severable from the rest of the statute. The Budget Control 
Act of 2011, for example, contained the following severability clause: “If any provision 
of this Act, or any application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to 
be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and the application of this Act to any other 
person or circumstance shall not be affected.” 
Severability clauses are readily discussed in Supreme Court cases. In National 
Federation, the lack of a severability clause garnered significant debate in the briefs 
filed in the case. The petitioners, believing the individual mandate to unconstitutional, 
argued that because the House version of the statute originally contained a severability 
clause but the clause was removed prior to passage, this should lead to the view that the 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act are inseverable and the entirety of the Act should 
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be invalidated. The Obama administration argued that the mandate was constitutional, 
but also conceded a limited amount of inseverability; if the mandate were ruled 
unconstitutional, it was inseverable from the provisions guaranteeing the issuance of 
insurance policies to individuals with preexisting medical conditions. 
While the individual mandate was ruled to be a constitutional, all of the justices 
seemed to at least implicitly agree that the mandate was inseverable from the guaranteed 
issue provision. This became an important point when the legislation under the Trump 
administration removed all financial penalties to individuals failing to comply with the 
Affordable Care Act. This triggered a number of lawsuits, arguing that a mandate 
without a financial penalty no longer constituted a tax and, as a result, was 
unconstitutional. Judge Reed O'Connor of the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Texas agreed in Texas et. al. v. U.S. et al. (2018), and further argued that 
given the Court’s decision in National Federation that the mandate was inseverable from 
the entirety of the law and thus was invalid. While the District Court ruling will likely 
not be the final say on the matter, the rule goes to show that such severability clauses can 
matter in judicial decisionmaking. 
Legal scholars have criticized how the Court approaches severability clauses. 
The Court’s current jurisprudence on these clauses, stated in Alaska Airlines v. Brock 
(1987), is “the inclusion of such a clause creates a presumption that Congress did not 
intend the validity of [the entirety of a statute] to depend on the validity of the 
constitutionally offensive provision.” But just two decades earlier in United States v. 
Jackson (1968), the Court frankly stated that “the ultimate determination of severability 
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will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause.” These statements infuriate 
many scholars, who see such statements as contravening legislative intent and entering 
into the realm of judicial policymaking (Nagle 1993, Gans 2008). 
Scholars have further argued that even if the Court consistently approaches 
severability clauses, their impact is limited given how the Court approaches severability 
doctrine as a whole. When approaching matters of severability, the Court does not 
approach each statute with a blank slate. Instead, the Court generally presumes 
severability for a statute, even if those statutes do not have a severability clause (Metzger 
2004, Gans 2008). This presumption reduces the power of severability clauses, which 
would also make the Court default to severability. Indeed, there is a significant scholarly 
claim that severability clauses have no effect on determinations of severability doctrine 
by the Court. 
While severability clauses have garnered much scholarly attention in the legal 
community, they have not been widely studied by political scientists. The sole study I 
have found in political science looks at the effect of severability clauses on judicial 
decision-making in cases only involving statutory questions (Maltzman et al 2014). 
While certainly a useful contribution in its own right, it sidesteps the core questions 
about the impact of severability clauses on constitutional law. Thus, we now develop 
expectations about how severability clauses might affect constitutional law. 
In order to develop predictions as to how severability clauses affect judicial 
decision-making, one must begin by questioning why Congress might adopt a 
severability clause in the first place. Implicit within the decision to include a severability 
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clause is the assumption that it will be relevant in a court case. But why would Members 
of Congress believe a law would come under review by a court? It is likely that these 
clauses are added to statutes that, at least from the perspective of some legislators, suffer 
from a somewhat rational objection to its constitutionality. But if this is true, then these 
statutes should be more likely to be the subject to a constitutional challenge in front of 
the Supreme Court at some point in time. This leads to a hypotheses: 
Constitutional Challenge Hypothesis: a court should be more likely to hear a 
challenge to a statute that includes a severability clause. 
Members of Congress would not be alone in recognizing constitutional 
deficiencies in legislation, however. Savvy attorneys could identify constitutional faults 
in legislation after it becomes law, which could inspire those opposed to such legislation 
to fund court challenges. The Supreme Court could also recognize these deficiencies 
and, wanting to fulfill its role as arbiter of constitutional matters, quickly decide to 
review the case. When these statutes come before the Court, it might not strike down 
every law. But the Court may be more likely to strike a law with a severability clause 
than without because of the underlying constitutional problems with statutes that led 
legislators to add a severability clause in the first place. 
This is not to suggest that severability clauses serve as a signal of the 
unconstitutionality of legislation. It would be absurd to think that Congress has a relative 
advantage in identifying unconstitutional statutory provisions relative to the Supreme 
Court; it might even be incorrect to assume they have more information relative to 
motivated attorneys. Rather, Congress only includes these clauses when engaging in 
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constitutionally dubious policymaking and, as a result, the Court is more likely to 
quickly grant certiorari to a constitutional challenge of these statutes and subsequently 
rule them unconstitutional. This leads to a pair of hypotheses: 
Challenge Immediacy Hypothesis: a court should be more likely to hear a 
challenge to a statute soon after its passage if that statute includes a severability 
clause. 
Constitutional Invalidation Hypothesis: a court should be more likely to rule a 
statutory provision unconstitutional when that statute includes a severability 
clause. 
Severability clauses may also influence judicial decision-making on the more 
technical legal matters when invalidating a statute. The clause instructs a court to sever 
some provisions of a statute from others if they are declared unconstitutional. 
Ostensibly, the legislature would include these clauses if it believed two related 
propositions: 1) that the Court rules statutory provisions inseverable frequently enough 
to warrant a legislative response, and 2) that the Court is less likely to rule a statute 
inseverable if that statute has a severability clause than if it did not. The former 
proposition is almost trivial, as the opportunity cost of including a boilerplate 
severability clause is next to nothing. The latter is contestable, as evidenced by legal 
scholarship on the matter, but leads to a clear hypothesis: 
Severability Clause Hypothesis: a court should be less likely to rule an 
unconstitutional provision of a statute inseverable from other provisions when 
that statute includes a severability clause. 
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4.5. Severability Doctrine as Statutory Decisionmaking 
Severability doctrine only becomes relevant when the Court is engaged in 
constitutional decisionmaking. Yet at its core, severability is a statutory question rather 
than a constitutional one. If a statute has a severability clause, then the Court’s choice is 
clear: Congress intended for unconstitutional provisions to be severed. In the absence of 
a clause, the Court must divine the intent of Congress using other means. Such a 
description clearly puts severability doctrine within the realm of statutory 
decisionmaking. As a result, positive models of statutory decisionmaking should be 
applicable to severability doctrine. 
There is broad consensus that statutory and constitutional cases involve different 
approaches to judicial decisionmaking. Of the many differences, one notable difference 
is the importance of elected officials’ preferences (Epstein and Knight 1997). In 
statutory decisionmaking, elected officials can respond to unfavorable decisions by 
passing new legislation. In order to make their decisions last, then, the Court must take 
into account the preferences of elected officials. In contrast, elected officials cannot 
respond to constitutional decisions via ordinary legislation. Instead, it can either pursue 
constitutional changes, which are much more difficult to enact, or court-curbing, a blunt, 
politically costly attempt to punish courts by changing their level of funding or amount 
of discretion (Clark 2009). This is not to say that constitutional courts generally, or the 
U.S. Supreme Court specifically, are completely immune to the influence of elected 
officials when engaging in constitutional decisionmaking (Vanberg 2001, Stephenson 
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2003, Clark 2009). Nevertheless, the Court is seen to be more sensitive to the 
preferences of elected officials when engaging in statutory decisionmaking. 
Perhaps the canonical model of statutory decisionmaking that takes into account 
the preferences of elected officials is Marks’ separation of powers model (2015).1 Marks 
explained why Congress would tolerate a statutory Supreme Court decision inconsistent 
with its preferences. If the pivotal actors in the policy-making process, such as the 
median member of the House, the median member of the Senate, and the president, share 
the same interpretation of a particular statutory provision, then they will respond to an 
unfavorable statutory decision by passing a statute containing said interpretation. 
Looking down the game tree, the Court would anticipate this reaction and adopt this 
desirable interpretation so that it is not statutorily overruled. But if a single pivotal 
member has a different preferred interpretation of the statute, the Court is free to choose 
a statutory interpretation it prefers so long as it is not too extreme. There is considerable 
debate as to whether this model has empirical support; proponents of the attitudinal 
model in particular argue for a negligible relationship (Spiller and Gely 1992, Segal 
1997, Segal and Spaeth 2002, Marshall, Curry, and Pacelle 2015). 
The separation of powers models could predict judicial decisionmaking on 
severability doctrine in at least two ways. First, elected officials may have preferences 
over whether a statutory provision should be construed as severable or inseverable. In 
this instance, it would be straightforward to apply the separation of powers model to 
arrive at concrete predictions. But while this is a promising line of research in theory, in 
practice it is likely to not influence Court decisionmaking. Elected officials do not 
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always take positions on cases before the Court, such as explicitly advocating whether a 
statute is severable or inseverable. Even when they do, such positions might be the result 
of a moral hazard given that they do not have to make the judgement on severability 
(Fox and Stephenson 2011). Thus while theoretically possible, such a relationship is 
unlikely to be observed. 
In a more promising vein, the separation of powers model may have a more 
general influence on severability doctrine. Deference to the legislature is one of the 
strongest principles used in severability. By ruling an unconstitutional provision 
inseverable, the Court may frustrate legislative attempts at policymaking. This is 
especially true if currently serving elected officials did not enact the statute under 
review; if even a single pivotal policymaker opposed the statute under review, it could 
prevent reenactment of otherwise constitutional provisions if they are ruled inseverable. 
If currently serving elected officials did enact the statute under review, however – or 
currently serving elected officials are uniformly supportive of the statute under review – 
then an inseverability ruling will not frustrate legislative policymaking because the 
otherwise constitutional provisions could simply be reenacted. This application of the 
separation of powers model also makes a clear prediction and, unlike the previous 
application, pivotal policymakers regularly take positions supporting statutes. This leads 
to a clear hypothesis: 
Pivotal Support Hypothesis: a court should be more likely to rule an 
unconstitutional provision of a statute inseverable from other provisions when 
the statute is uniformly supported by pivotal policymakers. 
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4.6. Research Methods 
In order to test the above hypotheses, I need to analyze a set of constitutional 
court decisions that also employ severability doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court provides 
an excellent test case for two reasons. First, the literature on severability doctrine almost 
exclusively focus on the U.S. Supreme Court, making the Court an ideal place to test my 
hypotheses. Second, the Court is the subject of a wealth of research on the ideological 
preferences of its members over a long period of time, with a particular emphasis on the 
measures of justice ideal points (Segal and Cover 1989, Martin and Quinn 2002, Epstein, 
Martin, Segal, and Westerland 2007, Bailey and Maltzman 2011). This will allow us to 
test whether severability doctrine can be predicted by the ideological preferences of the 
judges who use it. Third, the U.S. Congress regularly includes severability clauses 
within its statutes. This variation allows for statistical analysis to be conducted on many 
of the hypotheses. For these reasons, I analyze a subset of U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
from 1949-2011. 
Rather than solely focusing on U.S. Supreme Court decisions, however, this 
analysis draws on a statute-centered approach of previous studies (Hall and Ura 2015, 
Harvey and Friedman 2006, 2009). The study of judicial review inevitably leads to 
studying court decisions. Solely studying them in presence of a discretionary docket, 
however, can lead to a selection bias as strategic interactions may happen at the 
certiorari stage. This can negatively impact our ability to make inferences, meaning we 
must go beyond simply looking at decisions and look at the statutes which the decisions 
are about. Thus, the unit of observation in this analysis are federal statutes. Of course, 
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there are difficulties with looking at all federal statutes. Collection of the data would be a 
monumental task and would thus limit analysis to a small time period.  
As a middle ground, I analyze a subset of statutes enacted between 1949 and 
2011. The subset is whether a law is landmark legislation, as defined by Mayhew (2005). 
This results in an unbalanced time-series cross-sectional dataset of 368 statutes over the 
time period, with writs of certiorari granted to constitutional challenges 148 times and 
subsequent ruled unconstitutional 54 times. Of these rulings, 5 cases had otherwise 
constitutional provisions of a statute invalidated because they were inseverable from 
other unconstitutional provisions. 
In order to account for potential selection effects, as well as examine interesting 
relationships at the certiorari stage, I employ a Heckman multinomial probit model. The 
first stage is a model of the Court’s decision to hear a constitutional challenge to an 
important statute in a given year. The second stage is a model of the Court’s decision 
whether to invalidate, in part or in whole, the statute on constitutional grounds. Because 
the Court has many different options when ruling on the constitutionality of a particular 
section of a statute – constitutional, unconstitutional but severable, unconstitutional and 
inseverable from other parts of the statute – the second stage must be a multinomial 
probit model with three possible outcomes. I estimate the model using the cmp package 
developed for Stata by Roodman (2011). The comparison group is a statute that is 
invalidated but ruled to be severable from the rest of the statute. Standard errors are 
clustered by statute. 
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One could argue that a more appropriate modelling strategy would be a 
multinomial probit with four outcomes: constitutional, unconstitutional as applied, 
facially unconstitutional and severable, and facially unconstitutional and inseverable 
from other parts of the statute. Such a model would take into account distinctions 
between facial and as applied invalidations (Lindquist and Corley 2011). I do not use 
this approach for both theoretical and methodological reasons. Theoretically, there is 
little distinction between as applied invalidations and facial invalidations that are 
severable; both are means of preserving the original statute in order to defer to the 
legislature (Sherwin 2000). In the context of this paper’s questions, then, there is no 
reason to separate the two categories. Methodologically, a Heckman multinomial probit 
model with four alternatives would not converge during my estimation procedure.  
There are two crucial independent variables in this analysis, which I now 
describe in turn. The first measure is a dummy variable if a statute contains a 
severability clause. This includes general severability clauses, like the one contained in 
the Balanced Budget Control Act of 2011. It also includes more specific severability 
clauses that may only pertain to specific sections within statutes. This variable is 
included in both stages of the analysis, as there are relevant hypotheses about 
severability clauses at both the certiorari stage and the decision stage. Of the 368 statutes 
in the sample, 102 have severability clauses. 
The second variable represents Marks’ separation of powers model. I adopt a 
measure in the literature that estimates whether the current pivotal policymakers support 
or oppose a given statute under review (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011, Hall and 
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Ura 2015). I collect the original roll call votes for each public law from VoteView 
(Lewis et al 2017). Using logit, I then regress these roll call votes on the Common Space 
Score of Members of Congress and the president (Poole 1998).16 Using the resulting 
model coefficients, I can then predict the probability that a future elected official 
supports a law using their Common Space Score. Note that for those laws passed 
unanimously or via voice votes in both chambers, there is no variation to run regression 
models. In these instances, the predicted support for all future officials is 1. 
I then identify pivotal actors in the policymaking process, relying on the insights 
of Krehbiel (1998), and record the minimum level of predicted support to a statute from 
any of the pivotal actors. I test three different pivot models: the floor median model, the 
Senate filibuster model, and the party gatekeeping model. Each of these models are 
outlined in more detail in Hall and Ura (2015). The resulting measure gives the 
probability that the most hostile pivotal actor supports the law based on their ideology, 
as measured by Common Space scores. This variable is included in both stages of the 
analysis. While the Pivotal Support Hypothesis only makes predictions for the decision 
stage, Hall and Ura (2015) have shown how this variable also effects the certiorari stage. 
At the certiorari stage, I also include cubic polynomials to control for duration 
dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010). Inclusion of these variables is helpful for 
multiple reasons, both theoretical and methodological. Theoretically, including these 
variables and interacting them with other substantive variables allows me to estimate a 
                                                 
16 One statute, public law number 107-40, was predicted perfectly. Coefficients could not be generated it is 
subsequently excluded from the analysis. 
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nonproportional hazards model. This will be useful for testing the Challenge Immediacy 
Hypothesis, which suggests that statutes with severability clauses will be more likely to 
be reviewed by the Court immediately after passage than those without these clauses. 
Methodologically, these polynomials serve as the necessary instrument to estimate the 
Heckman model. 
At the second stage of the model, I control for the Court’s ideological 
predispositions. As indicated earlier, many scholars believe that severability doctrine is 
merely a legal guise for their ideological preferences. To measure the court’s ideological 
preferences, I use a combination of Bailey’s (2013) ideal point estimates of justices’ 
ideology and the direction of the decision classification from the Supreme Court 
Database. If striking a statute was consistent with the median member of the court’s 
ideological predisposition, then the observation is assigned the absolute value of the 
median member’s ideal point. If not, then the observation is assigned the negative of the 
absolute value of the median member’s ideal point. All cases where the ideological 
implications of a decision were unclear were coded as zero. This results in a measure of 
the court’s attitudes towards the case where positive values indicate the court is 
ideologically inclined to striking and negative values indicate the court is ideologically 
opposed to striking. 
I also control for additional legal doctrines that may influence decisions to strike 
laws and, more specifically, to strike laws as severable or inseverable. The Court has 
been noted to approach decisions in certain areas of constitutional laws different than 
others. Overbreadth doctrine suggests that the Court is more likely to invalidate and find 
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inseverable laws when challenged on free speech grounds, while equal protection 
doctrine suggests the Court is more likely to invalidate and find inseverable federal laws 
when challenged on due process grounds (Jona 2008, Lindquist and Corley 2011). 
Therefore, I also control for whether a free speech or due process challenge was brought 
against the law under review in the second stages of my analysis. 
4.7. Analysis 
Table 1 contains the results of the probit models used to examine the 
Constitutional Challenge and Challenge Immediacy Hypotheses. The first model 
includes the presence of a severability clause and proportional hazards. The model 
strongly supports the Constitutional Challenge Hypothesis. Statutes with severability 
clauses are more likely to be challenged than statutes without severability clauses. The 
model also supports the use of cubic polynomials as a means of modelling duration 
dependence within the data. The coefficient of the untransformed is statistically 
significant, and a joint Wald test of their coefficients is as well. Finally, the model 
replicates prior work showing that as the support for a statute from all pivotal 
policymakers becomes uniformly positive, the Court is less likely to hear a constitutional 
challenge to a statute (Hall and Ura 2015).17 
The second model includes nonproportional hazards from interacting the 
severability variable with the cubic polynomials. While these interaction terms are not 
statistically significant, they are also not the basis for a test of the Challenge Immediacy 
                                                 
17 Results for the Filibuster Gatekeeping Model and Party Median Model are in the replication materials. 
They are substantively similar, though the p-value of the pivotal policymaker coefficient changes. 
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Hypothesis. Rather, the Hypothesis suggests that there should be a difference only in 
those years immediately after the passage of the statute. Figure 1 presents the predicted 
probability that the Court will grant certiorari to a constitutional challenge of a statute by 
the presence of a severability clause and the number of years since its initial passage or 
previous challenge. Challenges to statutes with severability clauses are about twice as 
likely compared to those without severability clauses. This effect persists over time, but 
the gap between the two becomes smaller and smaller until at about 20 years post 
passage they are statistically indistinguishable from each other.18 Thus, we also find 
support for the Challenge Immediacy Hypothesis. 
 
Table 4-1: Probit Model of Constitutional Challenges Granted to an Important 
Federal Statute by Year, 1949-2011. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Severability Clause 0.39** 
(0.09) 
0.37* 
(0.16) 
Support of Pivotal 
Policymaker 
-0.30* 
(0.15) 
-0.30* 
(0.15) 
Years Since Previous 
Challenge 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
Years Since Previous 
Challenge2 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Years Since Previous 
Challenge3 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Severability Clause*Years 
Since Previous Challenge 
- 0.02 
(0.05) 
Severability Clause*Years 
Since Previous Challenge2 
- -0.00 
(0.00) 
Severability Clause*Years 
Since Previous Challenge3 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
Constant -1.62** 
(0.16) 
-1.60 
(0.16) 
                                                 
18 This is shown in the replication materials. 
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 Model 1 Model 2 
N 11628 11628 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, one-tailed tests used for hypothesized relationships 
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Statute are in Parentheses 
Table shows Floor Median Model; additional models in the replication materials  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Predicted Probability of the Court Granting a Constitutional Challenge 
to a Statute by Years After Initial Passage and Presence of a Severability Clause 
 
 
 
Turning now to the Constitutional Invalidation Hypothesis, Table 2 presents the 
results of the Heckman multinomial probit model.19 The first column contains the 
comparison between a statute being ruled as constitutional and being ruled as 
                                                 
19 To conserve space, only the second stages of the Heckman models will be shown. Results for the prior 
stages can be found in the replication materials. 
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unconstitutional and severable. The severability parameter is in the incorrect direction: 
statutes with severability clauses appear more likely to be found constitutional, not less. 
This result does not provide support for the Constitutional Invalidation Hypothesis. 
While the result is statistically significant using a two-tailed test, it does not conform to 
my expectation; therefore, I treat this statistically significant coefficient as a null result. 
The strong effect shown by the coefficient, however, indicates that future scholarship 
should further study what could be driving this result. 
While our hypothesis of interest in this model is not supported, many of the 
control variables perform as expected. When the Court is ideologically predisposed to 
striking, it is less likely to rule a law as constitutional; this result is largely consistent 
with previous research (Segal and Spaeth 2002). The Court is also less likely to find a 
law constitutional when it is challenged on free speech grounds: a statute in the sample is 
10% less likely to be found constitutional when challenged in this way. Interestingly, 
statutes challenged on due process grounds are more likely to be constitutional, not less. 
While this result goes against the current literature, it is hardly surprising. Due process 
challenges to statutes are often tacked on to other controversies in order to exhaust the 
possible litigation strategies. The justices undoubtedly know this and likewise view such 
challenges with suspicion, according to the results of the model: statutes challenged on 
due process grounds are 10% more likely to be found constitutional. Finally, the support 
of the pivotal policymaker has no influence on whether a law is constitutional or 
unconstitutional but severable; this comports well with previous research (Segal, 
Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). 
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Table 4-2: Heckman Multinomial Probit Model of Decision to Invalidate an 
Important Federal Statute, 1949-2011 
 Constitutional Unconstitutional and 
Inseverable 
Severability Clause 0.86 
(0.32) 
-0.14 
(0.20) 
Support of Pivotal 
Policymaker 
0.49 
(0.64) 
0.74* 
(0.39 
Court’s Ideological 
Predisposition to Strike 
-1.41** 
(0.47) 
-0.58* 
(0.28) 
Freedom of Speech 
Challenge 
-1.02** 
(0.37) 
-0.44* 
(0.22) 
Due Process Challenge 0.56 
(0.29) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
Constant -1.59 
(0.92) 
0.22 
(0.34) 
N Stage 2 148 
11,628 N Stage 1 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, one-tailed tests used for hypothesized relationships 
Comparison group is Unconstitutional and Severable 
Robust Standard Errors Clustered by Statute are in Parentheses 
Only Stage 2 Estimates are Shown to Conserve Space 
Table shows Floor Median Model; additional models in the replication materials 
 
 
The second column contains the comparison between a statute being ruled as 
unconstitutional and inseverable and being ruled as unconstitutional and severable.  A 
look at the severability parameter reveals it is negative and statistically insignificant. 
While this result is in the correction, it fails to provide support for the Severability 
Clause Hypothesis. Despite the Court’s current rhetoric concerning severability doctrine, 
it does not seem to respect the inclusion of a severability clause within a statute. Caution, 
however, must be used when interpreting this result: a null result is not necessarily 
indicative of a null relationship (Rainey 2014). Even still, the lack of support for the 
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expected relationship does cast further doubt on whether severability clauses affect 
judicial decisionmaking. 
In contrast, the support of the pivotal policymaker is positive and statistically 
significant. As the predict level of support for the pivotal policymaker shifts from 
completely opposed to the statute to completely supportive of the statute, the probability 
that the Court rules a statutes as inseverable rather than severable increases by 28%. This 
provides support for the Pivotal Policymaker Hypothesis. This particular result shows 
the Floor Median model. Additional models, found in the replication materials, also 
show positive coefficients. Their p-values, however, differ with a maximum of 0.16. 
The control variables also show interesting results. When the Court is 
ideologically predisposed to striking, it is less likely to rule a statute inseverable rather 
than severable. This statistically significant result indicates that critics concerns of 
severability doctrine are well-founded; ideology does play a role in severability 
determinations. From the results, it appears severability serves as a convienent tool for 
the Court to pick and choose which statutory provisions it wants in effect, echoing the 
concerns of Noah (1999). 
The free speech variable is negative and statistically significant. The Court is less 
likely to find a statute inseverable when it is challenged with a freedom of speech 
violation. While there was no formal hypothesis about this variable, it contradicts 
expectations from the literature that suggest that the Court is more likely to find statutes 
inseverable when challenged with a freedom of speech violation (Jona 2008). Whether 
this result is a null result or indicative of a different decisionmaking process should be of 
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future interest to scholars. Meanwhile, the due process coefficient is statistically 
insignificant and close to zero.  
Finally, a word about selection effects. While not presented explicitly, my model 
indicates that there sample selection bias that would be problematic outside of a 
Heckman modelling strategy; these results can be found in the replication materials. 
They show that failure to account for the Court’s discretionary docket creates inferential 
problems for scholars. Unfortunately, many prior studies that use Heckman models do 
not explicitly state whether there is evidence of selection bias, instead employing them 
only because of the possibility of such bias (Hall and Ura 2015, Harvey and Friedman 
2009). In future research, scholars should be more explicit about their findings. 
4.8. Discussion 
This study analyzed the determinants of severability doctrine in U.S. Supreme 
Court decisionmaking. Despite concern to the contrary, there are systematic influences 
of the Court’s decision to rule a statute inseverable rather than severable. Some of the 
results support the suspicions of the legal community: the Court does not seem to 
consistently employ severability clauses in their decisions using severability doctrine but 
does seem to consistently use its own ideological predispositions. Other results support 
positive theories derived from political science scholarship: a statute’s support by pivotal 
policymakers in Congress influences how it approaches severability doctrine while 
statutes with severability clauses are more likely to be granted speedy challenges to their 
constitutionality. 
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How do these results align with the principle of judicial deference to legislatures? 
The absence of a predictable relationship between severability doctrine and severability 
clauses indicates that judicial deference is not an important consideration in cases where 
the doctrine is relevant. The presence of a predictable relationship between severability 
doctrine and the Court’s ideology further compounds this concerning result. Yet the 
Court does seem to show deference when it takes into account the preferences of pivotal 
policymakers towards a statute under review. This deference is not necessarily to the 
elected officials who created that statute, as would be the case if severability clauses had 
an effect on judicial decisionmaking. Rather, this is deference to currently serving 
elected officials who will have to deal with the ramifications of the Court’s decision. It is 
unclear whether this form of deference is more or less desirable. Nevertheless, judicial 
deference does seem to have a role in the Court’s decisionmaking on severability 
doctrine. 
The results of the study indicate that the Court does not consider severability 
clauses when making decisions. But this finding begs the question: why does Congress 
include these clauses in the first place? Indeed, there is no existing study that 
systematically analyzes when Congress includes severance clauses in legislation. The 
area is ripe for study and will likely yield additional insight into the legislative process.  
Additionally, the results of the study also beg questions as to the effects of 
inseverability clauses. These less common clauses have the opposite function of 
severability clauses, stating that several, possibly all of the provisions of a statute are 
inseverable and if one is struck down, all have to be struck down. While these clauses 
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are rarely adopted by Congress, they are more frequently included in state legislation. 
There is some evidence that these clauses are taken more seriously than severability 
clauses by American courts, which could lead to different findings (Friedman 1997). 
When these clauses are included in legislation and what effect they might have on 
judicial decision-making are open questions that scholars should consider in future 
research. 
This study is not without limitations. There is concern about the generalizability 
of the findings, given that the research design focuses on statutes that are regarded as 
important. But the focus on important statutes excludes statutes with moderate to minor 
importance. In these cases, it is entirely possible that the results would differ and would 
be an interesting avenue for future research. 
  
 113 
 
4.9. References 
Bailey, Michael A. 2013. “Is Today’s Court the Most Conservative in Sixty Years? 
Challenges and Opportunities in Measuring Judicial Preferences.” Journal of 
Politics 75 (3): 821-834. 
Bailey, Michael A., and Forrest Maltzman. 2011. The constrained court: Law, politics, 
and the decisions justices make. New Haven: Princeton University Press. 
Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. "Back to the future: Modeling time 
dependence in binary data." Political Analysis 18(3): 271-292. 
Clark, Tom S. 2009. “The Separation of Powers, Court-curbing and Judicial 
Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53(4): 971-989. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1957. “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker.” Journal of Public Law 6 (2):279–295. 
Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 1997. The Choices Justices Make. Sage Press. 
Epstein, Lee, Andrew D. Martin, A. D., Jeffrey A. Segal, and Chad Westerland. 2007. 
The Judicial Common Space. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 
23(2), 303-325. 
Fox, Justin and Matthew C. Stephenson. 2011. “Judicial Review as a Response to 
Political Posturing.” American Political Science Review 105(2):397–414. 
Friedman, Israel E. 1997.  “Inseverability Clauses in Statutes” The University of Chicago 
Law Review 64(3):903-923. 
Gans, David H. 2008. “Severability as Judicial Lawmaking.” George Washington Law 
Review 76(3): 639-697. 
 114 
 
Jona, C. Vered. 2008. “Cleaning up for Congress: Why Courts Should Reject the 
Presumption of Severability in the Faces of Intentionally Unconstitutional 
Legislation.” George Washington Law Review 76(3):698-724. 
Hall, Matthew E. K., and Joseph D. Ura. 2015. “Judicial Majoritarianism.” The Journal 
of Politics 77 (3): 818-832. 
Harvey, Anna. 2013. A Mere Machine: The Supreme Court, Congress, and American 
Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Harvey, Anna, and Barry Friedman. 2006. “Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints 
on the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Rulings, 1987–2000.” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 31:533–562. 
Harvey, Anna, and Barry Friedman. 2009. “Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced 
Selection Bias in the Supreme Court’s Agenda.” The Journal of Politics 71: 574–
592. 
Ignagni, Joseph and James Meernik. 1994. “Explaining Congressional Attempts to 
Reverse Supreme Court Decisions.” Political Research Quarterly 47(2): 353–
371. 
Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal politics: A theory of US lawmaking. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and 
Luke Sonnet. 2017. Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. 
 115 
 
Lindquist, Stephanie A., and Pamela C. Corley. 2011. “The Multiple-Stage Process of 
Judicial Review: Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges to Legislation 
before the US Supreme Court.” The Journal of Legal Studies 40(2): 467-502. 
Maltzman, Forrest, Alyx Mark, Charles R. Shipan, and Mark A. Zilis. 2014. “Stepping 
on Congress: Courts, Congress, and Interinstitutional Politics.” Journal of Law 
and Courts 2(2): 219-240. 
Marks, Brian A. 2015. “A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policy Making: 
Grove City College v. Bell.” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations 
31(4): 843-875. 
Marshall, Bryan W., Brett W. Curry, and Richard L. Pacelle Jr. 2015. "Preserving 
Institutional Power: The Supreme Court and Strategic Decision Making in the 
Separation of Powers." Politics & Policy 42(1): 37-76. 
Martin, Andrew D., and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic ideal point estimation via 
Markov chain Monte Carlo for the US Supreme Court, 1953–1999." Political 
Analysis 10(2): 134-153. 
Mayhew, David R. 2005. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking and 
Investigations, 1946–2002. 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
McGuire, Kevin T. 2004. "The institutionalization of the US Supreme Court." Political 
Analysis 12(2): 128-142. 
Meernik, James, and Joseph Ignagni. 1997. “Judicial Review and Coordinate 
Construction of the Constitution.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (2): 
447-467. 
 116 
 
Metzger, Gillian E. 2009. “Facial and as-applied challenges under the Roberts Court.” 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 36(4):773-801. 
Movsesian, Mark L. 1995. “Severability in Statutes and Contracts.” Georgia Law 
Review 30(1): 41-83. 
Nagle, John C. 1993. “Severability.” North Carolina Law Review 72(1): 203-259. 
Noah, Lars. 1999. “The Executive Line Item Veto and the Judicial Power to Sever: 
What's the Difference.” Washington and Lee Law Review 56(1):235-246. 
Poole, Keith T. "Recovering a basic space from a set of issue scales." American Journal 
of Political Science 42(3): 954-993. 
Rainey, Carlisle. 2014. “Arguing for a Negligible Effect.” American Journal of Political 
Science 58(4): 1083-1091. 
Roodman, David. 2011. “Fitting fully observed recursive mixed-process models with 
cmp.” The Stata Journal 11(2): 159-206. 
Segal, Jeffrey A. 1997. “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of 
Congress and Courts.” American Political Science Review 91(1): 28-44. 
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Albert D. Cover. "Ideological values and the votes of US Supreme 
Court justices." American Political Science Review 83(2): 557-565. 
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal 
Model Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sherwin, Emily. 2000. “Rules and Judicial Review.” Legal Theory 6(3):299-323. 
 117 
 
Spiller, Pablo T., and Rafael Gely. 1992. “Congressional Control or Judicial 
Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations 
Decisions, 1949-1988.” The RAND Journal of Economics 23:463-492. 
Stephenson, Matthew C. 2003. ““When the Devil Turns … ”: The Political Foundations 
of Independent Judicial Review.” The Journal of Legal Studies 32 (1): 59-89. 
Stern, Robert L. 1937. “Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court.” 
Harvard Law Review 51(1): 76-128. 
Ura, Joseph D. and Patrick C. Wohlfarth. 2010. “’An Appeal to the People’: Public 
Opinion and Congressional Support for the Supreme Court.” Journal of Politics 
72(4):939-956. 
Vanberg, Georg. 2001. “Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to 
Constitutional Review.” American Journal of Political Science 45: 346–361. 
Whittington, Keith E. 2007. Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The 
Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in US History. 
New Haven: Princeton University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation has made a number of contributions to our understanding of 
judicial review. In Chapter 2, I argue that modelling judicial independence as an 
additive, rather than conditional, predictor of judicial review risks Type II Error in our 
models. Rather than encouraging the Court to strike down a statute or other government 
policy, as implied by previous empirical tests of theory, higher degrees of independence 
for the Court enables it to make decisions based on its own ideological predispositions, 
whether those predispositions support striking a policy or upholding it. I demonstrate 
empirically that this conditional modelling strategy is superior. Notably, this modelling 
strategy finds evidence for Marks’ Separation of Powers model and further clarifies the 
role political fragmentation plays in empowering judicial review. 
In Chapter 3, I argue that majoritarian judicial review needs to be considered in 
light of the separation of powers that characterize most governments with constitutional 
courts. When these branches have differing policy preferences in the U.S., the Court has 
different incentives to advance the policy goals of each: Congress provides material 
incentives and better represent public opinion while the president’s unilateral control 
over the varied functions of its office allow for more targeted persuasion on a given 
issue. I demonstrate that, under different circumstances, the Court is attentive to both the 
preferences of Congress and the president, though there is considerably more evidence 
that the Court supports the president. 
In Chapter 4, I examine the Court’s approach to severability doctrine when 
excercizing judicial review. Contrary to the assertions of legal scholars, the Court 
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consistently approaches decisions regarding severability. The Court is more likely to 
sever an unconstitutional provision when it is ideologically predisposed to striking, a 
finding that confirms the fears of some legal scholars. But the Court is also more likely 
to find a provision inseverable when the statute under review is universally popular with 
current elected officials, a clear showing of judicial deference. 
This study is not without limitations. There is concern about the generalizability 
of the findings, given that the conclusions from every chapter use a single dataset. The 
research design focuses on statutes that are regarded as salient at the time of passage. 
Many are also considered landmark statutes in retrospective review. But the focus on 
important statutes excludes statutes with low political salience. In these cases, it is 
entirely possible that the results would differ; future scholarship should focus on these 
statutes. 
In addition, this study only uses data from the U.S. Supreme Court. While the 
Court is one of the most important constitutional courts today, there are many additional 
constitutional courts in the world. These courts not only vary in their institutional design 
but also vary in the political contexts in which they operate. It is entirely possible that 
the relationships here would change in meaningful and interesting ways depending on 
the constitutional court examined; future scholarship should examine these theories in 
other constitutional courts. 
 
 
 
